Graduate Research Awards
for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
2014-2015 DEBATES

A Joint programme of

THE SIMONS FOUNDATION

and

The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP)
of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD)

POSITION PAPERS PRESENTED BY RECIPIENTS OF THE 2014-2015
GRADUATE RESEARCH AWARDS FOR DISARMAMENT, ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION

February 20, 2015
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD)
Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa, Canada
Preface

The Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation (GRA) programme was initiated by Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons, President of The Simons Foundation, in partnership with the International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada in 2003 (now known as Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada). The primary objective of the Awards is to enhance Canadian graduate-level scholarship on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) issues.

Since its inception, the Graduate Research Awards programme has provided over $265,000.00 in scholarships to Canadian graduate students working on policy-relevant NACD issues and has helped to encourage a new generation of young scholars dedicated to further expanding their knowledge and expertise on these critical issues.

The original format of the programme offered three Doctoral Research Awards and four Master’s Research Awards to support research, writing and fieldwork leading to the completion of a major research paper or dissertation proposal on an issue related to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. For the 2010-2011 GRA competition, The Simons Foundation offered to increase the funds available for the awards to allow a greater number of students to participate in the programme. This led ISROP to develop a new and innovative format for the GRA consultations held at DFATD headquarters in Ottawa which now consist of a series of live debates on timely issues.

This year, candidates presented arguments in favour and against the following topics:

Arms Control (WMD and conventional) in Conflict Zones and Non-permissive Environments: “Be it resolved that effective arms control is a necessary component and precondition for a sustainable peace settlement.”

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: “Be it resolved that Cold War era instruments are sufficient in achieving crucial nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives in the current post-Cold War international context.”

Space and Export Controls: “Be it resolved that existing provisions under international export control regimes (e.g. the Wassenaar Arrangement) are sufficient to effectively regulate the export of sensitive space technologies.”

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: “Be it resolved that Nuclear Cooperation Agreements are an essential part of the international architecture governing nuclear materials and technologies as articulated by the peaceful uses provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
Following an initial review of applications, 16 candidates were short-listed for further consideration and assigned one of the four debate topics. Applicants were then required to research and write, individually and independently, a 1,000 to 1,500 word position paper addressing both sides of the argument (“in favour” and “against”). The eight students who submitted the strongest position papers overall, as determined by the expert review panel, were selected to receive a Graduate Research Award of $3,000.00 and were assigned a topic and specific position to defend in person at the GRA Debates held at Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) headquarters in Ottawa on February 20, 2015. Additional monetary awards were also provided to the students deemed to have made the most effective arguments in support of their position at the debates.

The GRA Debates provided a unique opportunity for exchange among departmental officials, Canadian opinion-leaders and the next generation of experts in the NACD field. At the GRA Debates in Ottawa, officials of the International Security Bureau of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD) attended the sessions and DFATD hosted a working lunch in honour of the GRA recipients following the debates.

We wish to recognize Jasmin Cheung-Gertler of DFATD and Elaine Hynes of The Simons Foundation for their work to coordinate and execute the programme again this year.

We are pleased to acknowledge this year’s Graduate Research Awards recipients who each received a cash award of $3,000.00 from The Simons Foundation, and further congratulate Jean-François Bélanger, Susan Colbourn, William Leurer, and Jinelle Piereder who each received an additional cash prize of $1,000.00 for their exceptional performance at the GRA Debates in Ottawa.

- Jean-François Bélanger: Department of Political Science, McGill University
- Susan Colbourn: Department of History, University of Toronto
- Dylan Gagnon: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
- Brent Gerchicoff: Department of Political Science, Concordia University
- Sara Greco: Department of Political Science, Queen’s University
- William Leurer: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University
- Khalid Mahdi: Global Affairs, University of Toronto
- Jinelle Piereder: Global Governance, Balsillie School of International Affairs

The 2015-2016 Graduate Research Awards competition will be launched in fall 2015. We look forward to welcoming the next round of award winners at the GRA Debates in winter 2016.

Jennifer Allen Simons, C.M., Ph.D., LL.D.
Founder and President
The Simons Foundation

Heidi Hulan
Director, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD)
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Opening Remarks
Jennifer Allen Simons, C.M., Ph.D., LL.D.
Founder and President
The Simons Foundation

Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons is the founder and President of The Simons Foundation, a private foundation located in Vancouver, Canada, with a mission to advance positive change through education in peace, disarmament, international law and human security. As an award-winning educator, thought leader and policy advisor, Dr. Simons and her foundation have supported major international initiatives, providing critical financial support, convening international leaders in policy dialogue, and driving academic research. Her partnerships with other NGOs, academic institutions, the Government of Canada, international governments, and the United Nations have made her an important and effective actor in the effort to address violence and war. Dr. Simons was appointed to the Order of Canada for her contributions to the promotion of peace and disarmament and, among her many other awards and acknowledgements, she received the Queen Elizabeth II Golden Jubilee Medal in 2002 and the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee Medal in 2012.

Good Morning,

It is a pleasure to be here, participating with the new Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, Ms. Heidi Hulan - an associate from the past - and with her colleagues in the annual Graduate Research Awards seminar, a programme which The Simons Foundation partners with the International Security Research and Outreach Programme of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada.

This year The Simons Foundation celebrates 30 years of active, national and international, service to the peace and disarmament community.

And this is the 13th year of what we believe is – and I am sure I can speak for both Foreign Affairs and The Simons Foundation - a successful arrangement and worthwhile contribution to the development of specialist expertise on Canadian Foreign policy in disarmament in Canadian universities. We are pleased to provide students, in this field, with the opportunity to contribute to Canada’s foreign policy, to benefit financially, and to a possible path for future career choice.

I would to thank Jasmin Cheung-Gertler, of the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, and Elaine Hynes from The Simons Foundation for their continuing excellent organization and management of this programme.

I would like to welcome and congratulate the recipients of this year’s Awards and am looking forward to the first class debates that we have come to expect.
The debate topics are extremely relevant to today’s world which – in the last few years - has become a more dangerous place and with two dominant issues threatening the peace and security of the world.

The first is the rise of extremist, fundamentalist, barbaric Islamists - Boko Haram in Africa, Al Qaeda and ISIS in the Middle East – in danger of drawing the US, Canada and other Western nations into another war – into a new complex type of warfare with non-state actors engaging in savagery alien to the modern civilized conventions of International Law, of Human Rights; yet utterly modern in their utilization of the internet as a recruitment tool; as a tool to spur Muslims to wage war in their home countries; and for dissemination of fear and terror.

The second – and most important for nuclear disarmament -is the annexation of the Crimea and the destabilisation of the Ukraine by Russia, which has turned the clock back to East-West divisions reminiscent of the Cold War.

At the recent Munich Security Conference Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated Russia’s continual denial of military intervention in Ukraine; of its invasion and annexation of Crimea and insisted – among hoots and jeers from the high level participants - that Russia respects sovereignty and is committed to states’ rights to self-determination.

Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia has engaged in deliberately aggressive and dangerous behaviour provoking tensions between the United States and NATO countries; accusing the United States of destroying Russia’s relations with Europe; its military bomber flights committing numerous violations of nation’s airspace, near collisions and aggressive actions at sea in the Baltic Sea, the Arctic, the Black Sea and close to the US and Canadian borders; and its nuclear-capable submarines conducting daring undersea patrols.

Well over 60 dangerous incidents have been reported; including two potential collisions of Russian military aircraft, with transponders turned off, with civilian planes taking off from Copenhagen and Stockholm. Apparently it was only thanks to good visibility and alertness of the civilian pilots that collision was avoided. Less than a month ago, a Russian bomber, reportedly carrying a nuclear missile, and with its transponders turned off, was intercepted over the English Channel. All civilian air traffic had to be diverted because unlike military aircraft they do not have the capability of sighting the Russian aircraft on their radar.

President Putin is flaunting his nuclear option. Regardless of whether or not it is merely nuclear gamesmanship or serious threat, this provocative behaviour has raised the level of the discord between the US and Russia; threatens current arms control regimes; and creates the very real danger of nuclear accident which could lead to nuclear war.

Russia is building new generations of attack stealth submarines possibly armed with submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and has recently resumed its Cold War practice of arming its military aircraft with nuclear weapons.
The testing by Russia of a medium-range nuclear cruise missile - which Russia has denied - in contravention to the 1987 INF treaty, has been condemned by the United States; with Russia responding with counter-allegations about the US infringing the treaty.

The US-Russian bilateral nuclear security agreement, which replaced the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Nuclear Cooperation Treaty, and which Russia refused to extend, has fallen apart because of the Ukraine war, undermining nuclear security and adding to a more dangerous world.

Nuclear weapons are now part of the Ukraine crisis. They may or may not be in the Crimea. President Putin has approved basing dual-capable weapons systems there. And even if not, this possibility is feeding the growing enmity between the United States and Russia.

In June of last year, President Obama proposed to engage in negotiations with Russia to reduce the nuclear arsenals to 1000 and to “seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian tactical weapons in Europe,” but President Putin has ignored this proposal.

About the only good news is that the New START Treaty remains on track. Though one negative feature of the New Start Treaty - which could affect the current situation - is that the data exchange on cruise missiles “was allowed to expire” – a situation, which increases the level of uncertainty.

We will be coming into the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference with a new situation of hostile relations between Russia and the United States; with war rhetoric; with less interest in fulfilling Article VI obligations; and with commitments from the 2010 NPT Action Plan unfulfilled.

It is to be hoped that the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons; the Austrian Government Pledge; and perhaps even the Marshall Islands suits, will move disarmament obligations forward. Though the United States and the United Kingdom were formally present- and China informally present - at the Vienna Conference, it may have no positive consequences, especially as I heard that the US participated as an action against Russia!

It is extremely important that we make some headway on stalled nuclear disarmament process. All the nuclear weapons states are conducting extremely expensive modernizations of their arsenals with Russia determined - despite its poor economic status - to keep even with the United States. So, in effect, Russia and the United States are engaged in a new arms race. Both countries have increased the number of deployed warheads; and have an estimated 1,800 nuclear weapons on high alert status. Possession of nuclear weapons is considered to be more dangerous now than during the Cold War.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has moved the Doomsday Clock forward - two minutes ahead of 2014 - to three minutes to midnight. It is their considered opinion that “that global nuclear weapons modernizations, and outsized nuclear weapons arsenals pose extraordinary and undeniable threats to the continued existence of humanity.”
One disarmament measure that holds promise, as we await the hoped-for return to nuclear weapons reductions, is the Swiss Government-funded Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, with its emphasis on de-alerting nuclear weapons.

The Commission is examining existing nuclear alert status in all nuclear weapons countries; identifying, assessing and prioritizing potential practical measures for increasing warning and decision time, and otherwise reducing launch readiness, thereby reducing the risks associated with high alert status; and helping to establish an international norm against hair trigger launch readiness.

The Commission is chaired by General James Cartwright, former U.S. Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and members are former senior military officers, defence ministers, and national security experts from key countries and from all nuclear weapons states except North Korea.

The Swiss Government hosted a preliminary meeting at the United Nations last October, in which Dr. Bruce Blair, Global Zero Co-Founder presented a concept for a treaty on De-alerting Nuclear Weapons. Potential sponsoring governments for this treaty are Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland and China. Possible diplomatic approaches are under discussion.

The Commission Report will be released at the 2015 NPT Review Conference – I think on April 30th.

At a meeting of the Global Zero Commission at the Munich Security Conference, one Russian General spoke of this de-alerting project as a way for President Putin to re-engage with the West, suggesting that the Russians are looking for ways to “climb down”.

I know that this particular information may not be the specific focus of today’s debates, but I do urge you to reflect upon this dangerous situation. And perhaps when you return to your research, take up your positions in academia or in the foreign service, that you consider this an area in which you may be of great service.

So now, I am looking forward to the debates and I wish you every success.

Thank you!

February 20th, 2015

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1 3 March 2014
2 December 14, 2014
4 reported in Daily Express, “Intercepted Russian bomber was carrying a nuclear missile over the Channel”, Feb. 1 2015
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter appears to confirm that the GLCM Russia allegedly test-launched in violation of the INF Treaty is a nuclear missile and threatened further escalation if it is deployed.”

Austria “pledges to present the fact-based discussion, findings and compelling evidence of the Vienna Conference, which builds upon the previous conferences in Oslo and Nayarit, to all relevant for a, in particular the NPT Review Conference 2015 and in the UN framework.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Austria. 8-9 December, 2014

http://thebulletin.org/three-minutes-and-counting7938
Debate 1
ARMS CONTROL (WMD AND CONVENTIONAL) IN CONFLICT ZONES AND NON PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENTS

“Be it resolved that effective arms control is a necessary component and precondition for a sustainable peace settlement.”

IN FAVOUR
Argument presented by William Leurer

William Leurer is currently a Masters of Arts in International Affairs candidate at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. He holds a Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Political Science and certificates in ‘Peace and Post Conflict Studies' and ‘Globalization and Governance' from the University of Alberta.

BACKGROUND/CONSIDERATIONS

‘Effective arms control’

This is both a simple and a complex proposition. It is simple in that we can easily understand effective to mean that the arms control measures in question have achieved, or are in the process of achieving, their stated objectives; however, we use ‘arms control’ in three distinct yet interrelated contexts, resulting in a complex proposition. The first is ‘Complete and Total Disarmament’, and refers to the elimination of either weapons considered illegal under international treaty and customary law (such as chemical and biological weapons) or the demobilization and disarmament of military groups. The second is a notion of ‘Traditional Arms Control’, and refers to the regulation of armed forces to establish a balance of power or effective deterrence. Finally the third use refers to the various efforts of ‘non-proliferation’, and refers to the avoidance and prevention of the spread of weapons beyond their legitimate uses and users.¹

‘Precondition for sustainability’

While this term is related, it is nevertheless not synonymous with ‘precondition for negotiation, or implementation, or completion’. Arms control is not necessarily necessary for the introduction of peace settlement negotiations, nor the conclusion of an agreement. In fact, it is widely recognized in the academic literature that arms control is most effective and most prevalent when the associated actors are predisposed to its implementation, and therefore arms control is most likely to exist once a peace process has already begun. To reiterate: the beginnings of peace are not dependent on disarmament.²
‘Peace settlement’

We can assume that a peace settlement is a negotiated agreement to end or prevent hostilities, which has been freely consented to by the associated parties. As such this does not include a peace settlement arrived at by conquest or unilaterally imposed on one party by another, though it is by no means unimaginable that one party may be under a greater level of coercion than another. This also does not rule out peace agreements or assurances between a warring party and an external actor.

According to this definition, it must be concluded that any peace settlement will generally fall under one of two types. The first is a peace settlement characterized by the mutual exclusive sovereignty of the parties involved, and occurs following an interstate conflict, or an intrastate conflict resulting in partition. The second is a peace settlement characterized by parties consensually subsumed within a larger whole, and occurs primarily following intrastate conflict resulting in reintegration and power sharing.

IN FAVOUR

Peace settlements of conflicts characterized by the use or threat of illegal arms

This applies to any type of conflict (interstate or intrastate) within which one or more of the conflicting parties has clearly used weapons that are prohibited under international law. Such a peace is threatened by the mere presence of illegal arms. Conversely, an effective arms control regime in response to this type of conflict would be characterized by the total and complete disarmament of the illegal weapons from every associated party. Without the total and complete disarmament of the illegal weapons, any peace would quickly become unsustainable: the international community would not allow any regime to remain in control of illegal weapons and may resort to violent intervention to ensure complete disarmament.3

Following the confirmed use of nerve agent chemical weapons in Syria by the Syrian government, the Western international community threatened military intervention to assure the total and complete disarmament of the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons. However, the international community was able to reach an agreement with the Syrian government outlining Syrian ascendance to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the destruction of any Syrian chemical weapons. In this instance, effective arms controls ensured an existing peace between the Syrian regime and the international community.4

Peace settlements between two or more sovereign states or resulting in the partition of a state into two or more sovereign entities

Peace settlements that result in two or more sovereign states or mutually politically exclusive entities must respond to traditional conceptions of the security dilemma. This may result in some form of an arms race, which clearly threatens the stability of the relationship between the associated parties. Therefore, long-term stability will in part be dependent on the stabilization of the security relationship between the relevant sovereign entities. In this instance, deterrence
management is a function of arms control, which can be achieved through the application of various conceptions of traditional arms control. This is often achieved through the codification of the military status quo with associated timelines for achieving force reductions and maintaining prescribed limitations. Without arms control measures such as forms of Confidence Building Measures or Limited Forces Arrangements, it is difficult to maintain a sustainable peace between two sovereign entities facing a security dilemma.\(^5\)

Deterrence relationships can occur within a sovereign state, and an excellent example of the potential use of arms control as a deterrence management mechanism following a negotiated peace settlement is the Dayton Framework Agreement for the Post-Conflict Arms Control of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This framework ensured that the security arrangement between the two partially independent regions within the state was managed by a stable deterrence relationship. The peace settlement has been sustainable in the long-term with international assistance and the eventual inclusion of the regional international community within the necessary Confidence and Security building Measures outlined in the arms control agreement.\(^6\)

*Peace settlements resulting in the civic reintegration and power sharing between the associated parties*

Peace settlements where the conflicting parties have agreed to attempt to reconcile their differences and achieve some form of communal reintegration or power sharing must address the presence of illegitimate coercive actors. The prevalent presence of arms can prevent these peace settlements from succeeding due to the relatively high number of power centers within the state and the high possibility of individuals regressing to violence in order to address political, economic, or social grievances. Therefore, arms control is often utilized to help overcome the institutional anarchy resulting from the conflict and primarily includes activities of disarmament and the prevention of the spread of conventional weapons. Without these arms control activities it is very difficult for the conflicting parties to establish a single sovereign power able to provide necessary levels of state security. Thus arms control can be seen to both play a role in conflict management and provide support for the restructuring of the security sector and defence establishment.\(^7\)

A good example of the effectiveness of arms control as an aid to state restructuring is the peace settlement and development of post-war Mozambique. There the warring parties agreed to a cooperative scheme leading to national reintegration; arms control mechanisms were used to disarm political factions, paramilitary groups and civilians. The use of arms control mechanism for stable and predictable disarmament has ensured that Mozambique has been able to establish a relatively stable reintegration of the warring factions into the peaceful political processes of the state.\(^8\)

**AGAINST**

*Arms control as a hindrance to peace settlements*

A major objection to the inclusion of arms control as part of, or as an addendum to, a wider peace settlement is that they can serve to hinder the swift and amenable agreement to the
peace settlement by all relevant parties; the hindrance of arms control on peace settlements is typically ascribed to two major factors. The first is the prevalence of political and diplomatic linkage, whether the linkage is direct or indirect and intentional or unintentional. The most prevalent examples of arms control as a hindrance to a concerted peace settlement can be found in the multitude of failed negotiations between the US and the USSR following the instigation of arms control negotiations. The second factor constitutes the complications associated with multilateral negotiations, the negotiation form taken many arms control negotiation processes. Multilateralism not only serves to multiply the number of issues relevant to the discussion, but depending on the mechanism or forum chosen for the discussions, multilateralism can also serve to require that difficult conditions be met (such as unanimity) prior to the conclusion of any agreement. An enduring example of the difficulties of linkage and multilateralism in arms control negotiations is the long-term stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, which was last successful in drafting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996.

**Arms control addresses symptoms and not causes**

The most fundamental objection to the resolution is that the presence and use of weapons are a symptom of, rather than a basic cause of, hostility. Opponents argue that violent political conflict is primarily due to the prevalence of political or social issues such as an absence of political rights, economic inequality or the prevalence of poverty, and ethnic or religious discrimination, amongst others. They determine that long-term peace can only be sustained through concerted effort to address these systemic issues, and not by limiting the supply of weapons to the troubled areas.

**RECOMMENDATION**

I find the arguments in favour of the resolution stronger than the arguments against the resolution. First, the presence of illegal arms in a state greatly increases the likelihood of foreign intervention to ensure their elimination; clearly, a violent international intervention would threaten the long-term sustainability of a recently established peace settlement. Second, it seems clear that the presence of arms in the international system can constitute a cause of instability and political conflict. Clearly, arms control is necessary to ensure that an established peace settlement is not threatened by the emergence of a traditional security dilemma. Finally, although arms control regulations may slow the negotiation and implementation of a peace settlement, they have nevertheless been successfully been implemented through multilateral processes and have contributed to the reconstruction of destabilized states.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


7 Ibid. pp. 50-51.

8 Ibid. pp. 55-57.


Debate 1
ARMS CONTROL (WMD AND CONVENTIONAL) IN CONFLICT ZONES AND NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENTS

“Be it resolved that effective arms control is a necessary component and precondition for a sustainable peace settlement.”

AGAINST
Argument presented by Khalid Mahdi

Khalid Mahdi is a Master of Global Affairs (MGA) Candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. Khalid currently holds an Honours Bachelor of Arts Degree in International Relations and Political Science from the University of Toronto, with distinction. Khalid is a former intern of the NATO Council of Canada (Formerly the Atlantic Council of Canada), where he held the position of Security Analyst and Editor of the Canada’s NATO Program, and wrote extensively on Canadian Foreign Policy, NATO Security Policy and East Asian security. Khalid’s research interests include nuclear security, nuclear non-proliferation, and East-Asian security. Khalid is passionate about international security and intends to pursue a career in the Canadian Foreign Service, where he hopes to utilize such knowledge and expertise to aid in the development of Canadian policies towards these emerging security threats.

BACKGROUND

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was established in 1995, following the dissolution of its predecessor the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). The WA, along with various other export control regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) obligates members to maintain strong national export controls against illicit transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies.¹ In relation to space exports, the WA and the MTCR lists such things as certain satellite technologies, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets as sensitive dual-use technologies.² In the case of the WA, members are required to notify the Secretariat of any export license denials within 60 days, while at the same time provide bi-annual information exchanges on the transfer of such items to non-Wassenaar members.³

Although these regimes do not exclusively regulate the export of dual-use sensitive space technologies, debates surrounding their efficacy in this regard are nevertheless still relevant. Reference is often made to the success these regimes have had in harmonizing the export controls of their members, which has occurred through the development of ‘best practices’ regarding the export of dual-use technologies.⁴ Moreover, emphasis has been placed on the ability of the regime to adapt and update their control lists in the face of technological change.
Regarding the challenges these regimes face, critiques often focus on changing international circumstances and flaws inherent within them. Many question the ability of these regimes to manage the export of sensitive space technologies, particularly as private non-state actors have emerged to develop them, while economic globalization has allowed for the acquisition of such technology by an increasing number of states. Furthermore, the literature often looks toward the non-binding and voluntary nature of these regimes as a source of concern, particularly as national legislation and priorities dictate the behavior of states.

**IN FAVOR**

As mentioned, the success of multilateral export control regimes lies in their ability to adapt to technological change and economic globalization, which have resulted in the increased acquisition and development of sensitive space technologies. Against these acquisitions, bodies such as the WA has been praised as a mechanism for developing common standards and enhancing cooperation. Throughout the WA’s existence for instance, the regime has updated its control lists and established best practices for the export of these technologies, which has included a call for “greater vigilance” in the export of highly sensitive items. In 2000 for instance, WA members agreed to the adoption of harmonized criteria for the export of Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADs). At the 19th Plenary meeting in December 2013 as well, new controls on the export of police surveillance and intelligence gathering tools and internet protocol network surveillance systems and equipment were adopted. While such equipment is slightly less sophisticated than dual-use space technologies, progress in these areas nevertheless offers strong hope for the further regulation of these exports.

In addition to fostering cooperation, multilateral export control regimes have witnessed the continuous growth of their membership. Reference is made to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which grew from seven states in 1977 to 43 by 2007. Much of this growth, as Ian Anthony notes, occurred primarily after the Cold War, where former Soviet satellite states were brought into the regime. As Anthony notes, export control cooperation not only restricted the international flow of “sensitive and military relevant items” but was also a means for “enabling commercial and economic ties to grow.” Such membership will likely prove valuable in constraining the future ambition of these states, particularly those already operating in space.

Perhaps most importantly, this growing membership has provided incentive for non-members, who are fearful of hampering trade ties with current members, to improve their export controls and even join the regime. A case in point is India, who since 2011 has been attempting to gain entry into the NSG. In March 2013, Indian Foreign Secretary Raman Mathai announced that the country had strengthened its export countries to NSG and MTCR standards. He outlined how the national Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) list had been modified to either prohibit, or permit under license the export of dual-use items and technologies. As a space exploring state, the Indian case is a clear example of how sufficient these regimes are in attracting new members and regulating sensitive space technologies.

**AGAINST**

Although these regimes continue to update themselves in response to emerging sensitive space technologies, they nevertheless face numerous challenges that may detract from their ability to
effectively regulate these exports. Not only are the majority of these technologies being developed by non-state private sector actors, but the economic benefits reaped by the development of such technologies has fostered increased competition among states.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, the fact that these technologies are dual-use, whereby they can be utilized for civilian and military purposes, makes it difficult to both track their use and export. This is demonstrated by Heinz Gartner, who notes how the involvement of immediate distributors in the export of dual use technologies, generally means that manufacturers or sellers may not know the identity of the final recipient, or “end-user.”\textsuperscript{18}

Additionally, these regimes suffer from internal constraints that may hinder their ability to act efficiently and coherently. As demonstrated in the WA and MTCR, these regimes operate on the basis of consensus, whereby all members must adopt decisions unanimously in order to move forward.\textsuperscript{19} This has added both significant length to the addition of new members,\textsuperscript{20} while also enabling certain members to stall progress on developing controls for particular items. In the case of the WA, for instance, Russia had previously stalled efforts by the regime to control light weapons and MANPADs.\textsuperscript{21}

Such decision-making has also made it difficult to establish consensus on external state threats to these regimes, such as North Korea and Iran, an ambiguity that certain members have exploited. Reference is often made to Russia, who has provided civilian nuclear assistance to Iran, which many would argue goes against the norms enshrined in the NSG. In these instances, Russia has justified such actions on the basis of the IAEAs certification of Iran’s previous compliance with the NPT.\textsuperscript{22} As Russia continues to be a key actor in space, the allowance of such questionable transactions questions the ability of these regimes to stand united in the regulation of sensitive space technology exports, particularly controls that may hinder future Russian extraterrestrial and economic ambitions.

Lastly, decisions in these regimes are voluntary and non-binding. This is articulated by Michael Miner, who notes how the measures undertaken by these regimes are implemented in accordance with national legislation and discretion.\textsuperscript{23} Consequently, as Miner further stipulates, these regimes are simply a “fractured system” of trade controls, whereby each state imposes its own standards and unilateral decisions on trade and exports.\textsuperscript{24}

This issue is further compounded by the presence of private sector actors, who may view these export control policies as a hindrance to their economic interests. As Mitchel B. Wallerstein notes, the costs associated with procuring licenses for sensitive dual-use technologies not only deter companies from developing such items, but force these corporations to move their operations abroad.\textsuperscript{25} Consequently, such costs have led to significant lobbying against these provisions. In 2013, for instance, US industry pressure helped repeal provisions from a 1999 Congressional defence bill, which placed satellites and related items on the US Munitions List and hence under the purview of the American International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, with industries often lobbying against the imposition of such controls, the nonbinding nature of these regimes places future controls at risk of being captured by industry.

**RECOMMENDATION**

As demonstrated above, the existing provisions under international export control regimes are not sufficient to effectively regulate the export of sensitive space technologies. While these regimes have fostered cooperation and established an array of controls, it is their existing
provisions that are ultimately problematic. With both greater competition for resources, and an increasing number of states establishing space operations, the risk remains that members will pull their support controls that could potentially hinder their extraterrestrial ambitions. As shown, the consensus decision-making model has been responsible for stalling progress on both the adoption of controls and accession of new members. Lastly, these deficiencies will be compounded by both a growth in the development of new technologies and the emergence of non-state space actors.

It is therefore recommended that members enact more weighted voting procedures, and also consider adopting more binding commitments and stronger enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, a framework for encouraging greater participation by private sector actors should also be developed.

**ADDENDUM**

Although multilateral export control regimes have garnered much international support, their legitimacy is hampered by the exclusion of key suppliers of sensitive dual-use technologies, such as China, Iran, and India. With most of these states maintaining extensive space programs, their exclusion will only drive further competition with current members. Furthermore, the addition of new members is likely to further complicate and paralyze the consensus decision-making models of these regimes.

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**Debate 2**

**NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT**

“Be it resolved that Cold War era instruments are sufficient in achieving crucial nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives in the current post-Cold War international context.”

**IN FAVOUR**

*Argument presented by Jinelle Piereder*

*Jinelle Piereder* is a Master of Arts in Global Governance candidate at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and a Graduate Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo, Ontario. As part of her Fellowship, Jinelle works with Dr. David Welch in the area of empathy-building in Asia-Pacific security, specifically researching air defense identification zones (ADIZs). Jinelle holds a Bachelor of Arts in Global Studies from Wilfrid Laurier University, where she focused on disarmament issues and international humanitarian law, the use of multi-faith dialogue in North and Sub-Saharan African conflicts, as well as the issue of state-induced famine. She also served as a research intern at Project Ploughshares, contributing to their 2014 Armed Conflict Report. Under the supervision of Dr. Tad Homer-Dixon, Jinelle’s current research involves utilizing complexity science and social network theory to better understand advocacy and multilateral negotiation around human security issues. Specifically, her work aims to unpack the relationships between ideational, institutional and material networks in the global arms trade and control system.

**BACKGROUND**

This past November, the world celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, a symbolic end to the Cold War in 1989. Yet, while this supposedly marked the end of a nuclear arms race, nuclear weapons remain with us. Walls can fall, wars can end, but the bomb cannot be “un-invented”. However, we need not surrender ourselves to fatalism. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis – the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war – world leaders came together in the spirit of multilateralism and “good faith” to address humanity’s biggest threat. Building on their work over four decades ago, we are left to continue to devise pathways of restraint towards a world without nuclear weapons.

At the centre of the current regime is the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Based on the pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear technology, the NPT is the most widely ratified international treaty, with 190 states parties. Thanks, in part, to the NPT, the Conference on Disarmament (CoD) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the world has not seen another use of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima and Nagasaki seventy years ago; stockpiles have been significantly reduced across all nuclear weapons states (NWS); safeguards have been implemented across the world; and predictions of vast proliferation have been avoided.ii
While we have seen progress towards non-proliferation and disarmament goals, there has been significant slowdown since the 1990s. There is still no ratified Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); the CoD is in a sixteen-year stalemate; the IAEA lacks the resources necessary to detect or punish NPT violations; India, Israel, and Pakistan remain non-signatories to the NPT; and there are growing non-compliance and proliferation issues, including North Korea’s NPT withdrawal in 2003, the “Iranian problem”, and the threat of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, many non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) claim that NWS have not lived up to their disarmament commitments in Article VI. Given these challenges, and as we prepare for the ninth Review Conference in April/May of this year, the question remains as to whether the NPT and its related instruments are sufficient to achieve crucial nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.

IN FAVOUR

a) The NPT and the current regime are more likely to achieve non-proliferation and disarmament goals due to the near universality of the NPT, and the progress so far.

The near-universality and long-standing legitimacy of the NPT must not be underestimated. At this point in time, this degree of support is unlikely to be achieved for any other treaty or process, especially from nuclear weapon states. It is true that several nuclear powers are not NPT members; yet, the existence of the treaty provides a set of international norms (not least of which is the norm of non-use) in addition to legal demands for its members. While a nuclear weapons convention may be part of our longer-term goals, it may at this point simply serve to drive a wedge further between the NWS and NNWS. It would not necessarily be more effective than the current non-proliferation regime, nor avoid some of the same pitfalls, including varying interpretations of the requirements, a lack of “good faith” in meeting them, and enforcement challenges. While additional forums and treaties must come about and will be necessary to achieve NPT goals, they will not and cannot completely supplant the NPT.

b) Cold War instruments carry with them a historical and legal significance that should not be taken for granted.

The NPT, CoD, and IAEA are relevant to the pursuit of non-proliferation and disarmament goals in a post-Cold War world precisely because of the historic weight they carry. They embody the palpable fears of nuclear war and potential human extinction that existed during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the level of diplomacy and empathy required to prevent it. Most importantly, Cold War instruments provide a foundation for any efforts we pursue now, and contribute to a powerful psychological engine that moves us toward our goals. External agreements risk sidestepping this history. Despite its challenges, the NPT along with its accompanying mechanisms remains true to its three pillars by providing a legal basis for non-proliferation, a multilateral disarmament framework, and facilitation of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
c) There is hope to be placed in the 2010 Action Plan, the Humanitarian Conferences, and renewed state engagement with the regime.

Thus far, the goal of non-proliferation has over-shadowed the goal of disarmament, in large part because of specific voices privileged over others. But a new emphasis on the parallel and simultaneous goals of disarmament and non-proliferation is evident in the events since 2010, including the 2010 Action Plan, the Humanitarian Conferences, the signing of New START between the U.S. and Russia, and the Nuclear Security Summit. The overall goal of disarmament is a world without nuclear weapons. Yet, there is a need to realize that disarmament will not be a linear, continuous process, but will consist of "minimization" and "elimination" stages. The regime comprises a set of tools, but they will only be useful in achieving our goals if states (1) effectively engage in utilizing them, if leaders are (2) empowered to actually do what is needed, and if people (3) empathize with each other and take each other’s concerns seriously. Developments in the last five years point to an increase in these factors, indicating that the NPT and associated instruments are up to the job of meeting non-proliferation and disarmament goals.

AGAINST

a) The NPT is based on an eroding double-standard, which brings with it an inherent potential for nuclear proliferation.

The late Jonathan Schell was convinced that the "core bargain" of the NPT – that NNWS would gain access to nuclear energy technology in exchange for renouncing nuclear weapons, while the NWS were permitted to retain theirs – was a Trojan Horse for the nuclear "haves" to keep the "have-nots" in their place. While the intention of the NPT was not necessarily to create "nuclear apartheid", many are concerned that this is exactly what has happened. Despite technology sharing and assistance on the part of the NWS, NNWS feel short-changed. Furthermore, if nuclear power status continues to translate into political benefits (including enhanced deterrence ability), then the persuasive ability of NWS to discourage NNWS or non-state actors from acquiring the weapons is degraded; the world will be perpetually in an "n+1" situation, where "n" is the current nuclear powers and "1" is the new nuclear candidate. The only real guarantee of non-proliferation is disarmament. Yet, NPT parties cannot seem to agree on how these goals should work together.

b) The current regime may not be able to overcome the multiple points of division between the NWS and NNWS.

The views of NWS and NNWS generally diverge regarding four points: (1) the priority of nuclear disarmament, (2) the demands of Article VI, (3) the definition of credible progress, and (4) the best way forward. Within the existing regime, NWS progress has typically been in slow, "easy steps". NWS tend to view the goal of a world without nuclear weapons as long-term and aspirational, and take a “lowest common-denominator approach to nuclear disarmament” in order to achieve participation and cooperation. Recent efforts in the P5 Process demonstrate this well, although a glossary of nuclear terms is certainly a good, but ‘safe’ first step. In contrast, NNWS condemn NWS for their lack of adaptation, adherence to outdated deterrence strategies, and pattern of procrastination. The track-record of Review Conferences has demonstrated, more often than not, an unwillingness to take each other’s concerns seriously.
RECOMMENDATION

While many are concerned with the fragility of the current non-proliferation regime, it is unlikely that a separate nuclear weapons convention (or some other treaty) would garner the same level of support as the NPT, or be able to avoid some of the same pitfalls. Furthermore, many of the challenges currently facing the regime are due to (mis)interpretations or poor application of the NPT principles, or political gridlock, and are not necessarily inherent to the framework. For this reason, I argue that the NPT and its accompanying instruments are sufficient to achieve non-proliferation and disarmament goals, so long as states are empowered to use them, effectively engage in the regime, empathize and take each other’s concerns seriously. However, we certainly cannot afford “business as usual”, simply managing crisis after crisis as it arises, or allowing a few states to dominate the conversation. Maintaining focus on the humanitarian discussion, and implementation of the 2010 Action Plan are key in utilizing Cold War era instruments in our post-Cold War world.

ADDENDUM

Ultimately, the interconnected goals of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are not within reach without sincere and effective engagement with the NPT and its related mechanisms. A musical instrument does not play or tune itself; if we are dissatisfied with the music, perhaps the problem lies in the capacities and energy of the musician. Crucial to this engagement process is reducing the political salience of nuclear weapons and fundamental changes in the nuclear doctrines of NWS (particularly the U.S.) to better align with the spirit of the NPT. Re-articulations of goals and agendas will not create change on their own but are certainly a necessary condition. Yet, as Schell points out, this forward-motion and the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world will require a significant expansion of imagination on the part of our global leaders and citizens.

ENDNOTES

i Susan Burke, “Is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Failing?”, Video Lecture at the James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies.

ii Susan Burke, Video Lecture; Thomas Graham Jr. "Avoiding the Tipping Point", Arms Control Today.


vi The Economist, "The future of non-proliferation: an awkward guest-list", 1-2,4.

vii Thomas Graham Jr., 1.


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Debate 2
NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

“Be it resolved that Cold War era instruments are sufficient in achieving crucial nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives in the current post-Cold War international context.”

AGAINST
Argument presented by Dylan Gagnon

Dylan Gagnon is currently in the first year of his Master’s Degree at the Norma Paterson School of International Affairs, specializing in Intelligence and National Security. He entered the School after completing his Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies at Bishop’s University. Dylan has notably received the William Barton Arms Control Award and has held an internship with the European Ideas Network at the European Parliament in Brussels. He is originally from Kingston, Ontario.

OPENING STATEMENT AND ARGUMENTS

In order to determine whether or not Cold War era instruments have been sufficient in achieving non-proliferation and disarmament goals in a post-Cold War era it would be useful to have a general understanding as to what constitutes an instrument. I’ve generally interpreted this to indicate treaties that have specific goals of non-proliferation and disarmament or international organizations that exist for similar purposes. The quintessential treaty for this purpose is the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT and its verification organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency or IAEA. This would also include various Nuclear Weapon Free Zones created during the Cold War, including the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga.

Now, I believe there to be roughly four main problems that Cold War instruments are incapable of dealing with today.

The first would be the fact that there have been a number of states that have evaded the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements that they have signed with the IAEA and which were mandated under the NPT. Iraq is probably the best known case to have cheated on its obligations, when it was discovered in 1991 to have been investing in nuclear weapon technology for nearly a decade. This is what led to the creation of the IAEA Additional Protocol that allowed for verification of undeclared nuclear materials. Even today it can be found that the Comprehensive Safeguards are not enough, as Syria was found to be hiding nuclear facilities in 2007. The cases of Iraq and Syria demonstrate that it was and still is possible for states to cheat on their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and develop nuclear weapons through clandestine means. In order to catch such potential cheaters, it is clear that verification must go beyond what was developed in Cold War instruments.
The second argument that I would like to address today is that Cold War instruments largely view states as the only proliferators, they do not take into account proliferation by individuals, whether working for terrorist organizations, criminal syndicates or transnational proliferation networks. Now, it has been shown in most cases that for any of these non-state actors to get a hold of nuclear material let alone an actual nuclear weapon is quite difficult. However, there remains an adverse risk that individuals would be able to supply technical components or expertise on how to build a nuclear weapon. The most obvious example that comes to mind is the A.Q. Khan network, which reportedly offered assistance to 18 states. Furthermore the Network assisted Iran, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan and Syria in developing their nuclear weapons programs. This has largely been dealt with by UN Resolution 1540 which requires all states to adopt legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their delivery systems and their illicit trafficking. This Resolution demonstrates that previous instruments such as the NPT were unprepared to deal with proliferation at the individual level.

The third argument against sufficiency of Cold War era instruments in a post-Cold War era is that they do not properly address indirect aspects of nuclear weapons that are ultimately tied to both non-proliferation and disarmament goals. I’ve already mentioned the intrusive IAEA Additional Protocol, but there are others as well. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty or CTBT that essentially bans the explosion of nuclear devices for testing purposes is a good example. Since it was opened for signature in 1996 183 states have signed it, of which 162 have ratified it, even though it has not yet entered into force. Similarly the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty which is currently being debated in the Conference on Disarmament, calls for a ban on the production of nuclear materials and further verification measures to ensure this ban. In 2014 at the Conference on Disarmament American Acting Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller stated that negotiating the FMCT would be “an essential prerequisite for global nuclear disarmament.” Therefore, the creation of these Treaties and mechanisms demonstrates the need to move beyond the instruments of the Cold War in order to address all aspects of non-proliferation and disarmament.

The final argument is a bit more theoretical, that is, the NPT framework creates a problematic divide between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. It largely places emphasis on Non-Nuclear Weapon States not to acquire or construct nuclear weapons. Although Nuclear Weapon States agree to receive some of the onus by not transferring their nuclear weapons, in reality few have ever actually done so or desired to do so. Furthermore, the NPT provision for disarmament is open ended, it commits all parties to the Treaty to disarmament at an unspecified point in the future, with no conclusive framework about how or when this is to be done. The result of this is that there has been a divide between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Nuclear Weapon states continuously see proliferation as the greatest threat to international peace and security and an obstacle to their disarmament. On the other hand Non-Nuclear Weapon States believe that disarmament and lowering the number of nuclear weapons must be achieved to guarantee non-proliferation. Thus there remains an almost intrinsic divide implied by the NPT, and is why many of the aforementioned post-Cold War era treaties, such as the CTBT or the FMCT, have been designed to tackle the security concerns of both groups.
Thus, for these reasons, I argue that Cold War era instruments, while phenomenal for their time, have become outdated and are no longer sufficient for the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament.

CLOSING STATEMENT

Since we are now on the closing statements I wish to reiterate my earlier points as the against side. Cold War era instruments have not been sufficient to deal with proliferation and disarmament in a post-Cold War era because:

- The case of Iraq demonstrated that it was possible to evade safeguards put in place by a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA
- Cold War era instruments do not account for proliferation of nuclear technology or information by individuals and transnational proliferation networks
- They do not take into account other various aspects of nuclear weapons related to non-proliferation and disarmament, including a prohibition on testing nuclear weapons and fissile material production
- The quintessential non-proliferation Cold War instrument, the NPT, places emphasis on NNWS and non-proliferation, not on NWS and disarmament, thereby creating a political divide between the two goals

However, I believe that it would be safe to say that Cold War instruments have had a number of both successes and failures in the post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, I wish to stress that even though 40 states that could build a nuclear bomb today have not done so, we should pay greater attention and essentially judge Cold War instruments on their failures. Why? Because if any one state does acquire or construct a nuclear weapon it can drastically alter international politics and create a new threat to international peace and security. The potential destruction that could be wrought by a nuclear explosion, particularly on a civilian population, is devastatingly unthinkable. The same applies for the possibility of an accidental nuclear explosion.

Similarly, although it is almost certain that the NPT and other Cold War instruments have assisted non-proliferation and disarmament, with what degree of certainty can successes be attributable to them? Could for example non-proliferation also be attributed to an absence of strategic dilemmas due to the fact that many Non-Nuclear Weapon States fall under the nuclear umbrellas of Nuclear Weapon States? Or could normative behaviour against acquiring and proliferating nuclear weapons be attributed to non-proliferation instead of the instruments developed to maintain and implement them? Thus, if Cold War era instruments are not attributable, how can we say that they were sufficient during the Cold War, let alone the post-Cold War era? Now, these are questions to which much research has already been conducted and to which there may be no clear answer, but it is something to consider in the area of the social sciences and international affairs.


Debate 3

SPACE AND EXPORT CONTROLS

“Be it resolved that existing provisions under international export control regimes (e.g. the Wassenaar Arrangement) are sufficient to effectively regulate the export of sensitive space technologies.”

IN FAVOUR

Argument presented by Susan Colbourne

Susan Colbourne is a Ph.D. Candidate in History at the University of Toronto and a Junior Fellow at the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History. Her dissertation, entitled “Out of Area? The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Collapse of Détente, 1975-1982,” examines the alliance’s response to the unravelling of superpower détente. It considers, in particular, the intersection between nuclear, strategic, political, economic, cultural, and ideological questions in allied decision-making and allied perceptions of the Cold War. Prior to her doctoral studies, Susan completed an MA in the History of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (2011) and an Hon. BA in History and International Relations at the University of Toronto (Trinity College, 2009).

BACKGROUND

Multilateral export control regimes are among the most important tools in the global non-proliferation effort.¹ These informal, non-binding agreements develop control lists — a detailed inventory of technologies and munitions whose transfer should be monitored for reasons of international security — in order to prevent the development and deployment of destabilizing weapon systems.² There are four significant export control regimes, each of which focuses on restricting specific technologies: the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. These four regimes built upon earlier Cold War-era initiatives designed to prevent the states of the Warsaw Pact from acquiring Western military technologies.³ Only two of the existing control regimes, however, relate to the potential transfer of space technologies: the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement and the 1987 MTCR.⁴

The Wassenaar Arrangement serves primarily as a means of increasing global transparency regarding arms transfers. With the end of the Cold War, Wassenaar’s predecessor, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Control (COCOM), became obsolete as its East-West approach to export controls no longer fit the new realities of the international system.⁵ Forty-one participating members, which include most of the globe’s major arms exporters, collaborate to develop an export control list of dual-use (i.e., civilian and military) technologies, as well as a dedicated Munitions List. Wassenaar’s overarching objective is to prevent “destabilising accumulations” of dual-use technologies that could threaten regional or international stability.⁶ This consensus-based institution does not, however, comprise a means
of enforcing the control lists’ provisions, thereby leaving final decisions regarding transfers to member states.

The MTCR similarly relies upon the cooperation of thirty-four participating states to develop an export control list aimed at preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Accordingly, MTCR’s control lists include technologies related to the development of missiles, delivery systems, space launch vehicles, and unmanned vehicles. As with the Wassenaar Arrangement, there are no institutional enforcement or verification mechanisms. The Hague Code of Conduct, developed as a supplementary confidence-building measure to the MTCR, provides further guiding principles focused on ballistic missiles and preventing future proliferation.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR

There are three main arguments in favour of the existing multilateral export control regimes’ ability to regulate space technology transfers: (i) the valuable flexibility of a “soft legalization” approach; (ii) their successes developing international norms; and (iii) their transparency and information-sharing regarding sensitive space and other military technologies.

Consensus-building within multilateral export control regimes harnesses the advantages of informal structures, rather than relying on legal requirements and regulations. This “soft legalization” has two key advantages: flexibility and the preservation of participating states’ sovereignty. First, the absence of binding treaties enables export control regimes to meet new challenges and adapt to the ever-changing technological landscape. Current arrangements leave the enforcement and verification requirements to individual participating states, which removes a potential obstacle to the success of multilateral negotiations. Rather than debating new legal obligations, participating states can instead update control lists to reflect current trends in proliferation and transfers of space technologies.

“Soft legalization” has been credited for two key successes of export control regimes: institutionalizing broad, multilateral cooperation on non-proliferation and the creation of rules and norms. These regimes provide a forum for regular multilateral consultation on potential security threats and new technologies. With the end of the Cold War, export control regimes are no longer simply groups of allied, “like-minded supplier states,” but instead bring more stakeholder nations to the table. Achieving consensus among disparate participating states contributes directly to the development of international norms regarding non-proliferation and the potential weaponization of space. Through the development of export control lists, participating states identify sensitive technologies. These highlight key areas of the international non-proliferation effort and develop best practices which can be adopted by participating and non-participating states alike.

Both the Wassenaar Arrangement and the MTCR actively promote multilateral discussions and reporting on export licenses and transfer requests. In addition to providing a forum for capacity-building, these reporting and transparency provisions are vital to the success of global non-proliferation efforts. Frequent sharing of transfer requests, particularly those that have been denied, can highlight potentially dangerous trends and drive changes in the existing export control lists.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST

Existing multilateral structures of export control are insufficient to regulate sensitive space technologies for three reasons: (i) significant omissions in the existing control regimes; (ii) a lack of international or supranational oversight; and (iii) the prominent position given to national export control policies under the Wassenaar Arrangement and the MTCR.

Numerous technologies remain outside the existing treaties and arrangements regarding outer space. The existing regimes’ deficiencies are evident from the outset, as none of the existing export control regimes specifically address transfers of space technologies. Only those space technologies with missile applications are covered by the MTCR. Wassenaar includes other relevant technologies in an “all-encompassing approach,” placing a sweeping definition of technology alongside tanks and other conventional weapons. The limited scope of international law regarding outer space compounds upon the regimes’ shortcomings. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty guarantees the peaceful use of outer space and expressly prohibits the presence of weapons of mass destruction in the cosmos, building upon United Nations Resolution 1884. Other space-based weapons, such as missile systems or anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), are not explicitly addressed in existing international law.

Multilateral export control regimes leverage informal and voluntary collaboration, but retain individual states’ enforcement mechanisms. What results is a “fractured system” whereby national and security interests dictate export policies. These multilateral export control regimes therefore lead to an uneven, inconsistent policy rooted in each state’s own priorities. There is no international or supranational organization charged with oversight and verification, nor does a dispute resolution mechanism exist to ensure intra-institutional cohesion. The absence of an oversight body limits the effectiveness of export control regimes in two key ways. First, existing provisions in the regimes can not be enforced, such as MTCR’s pledge to prevent member states from serving as a middleman in transfers. Second, it limits the ability of regimes to expand their controls into areas of concern, such as brokering and transit.

Participating members’ export control regimes continue to play a crucial role in Wassenaar and the MTCR. National export control policies implement regime control lists, making the decisions regarding export licenses and transfers. This can undermine the effectiveness of consensus-built control lists, as individual nations are able to interpret the lists as desired. Without any further enforcement mechanism or means of resolving disputes, participating members face minimal consequences for defection. Given the implications of export controls for domestic industry and research, the continued prominence of national controls does raise some concerns. Take, for example, the United States’ International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which faced considerable criticism from the United States’ commercial space industry over technology controls. Industry representatives argued that ITAR controls impacted demand, purchase patterns, and even international collaborations within the commercial space industry, as numerous nations preferred to purchase “ITAR-free materials” to avoid the complex limitations of the United States’ export controls.

RECOMMENDATION

Significant gaps exist in the current framework of multilateral export control regimes. Major types of space technology are not addressed within these regimes or existing international law relating to space, such as ASATs which are currently under development in the People’s Republic of China and the United States. Furthermore, export control regimes only address one
component of proliferation in space technologies: the transfer of sensitive information. It does not address the domestic development of technologies, including of space-based weapons systems such as the United States’ current research on Ballistic Missile Defense. For these reasons, I favour the arguments against the resolution at hand.

The informal nature of multilateral export control regimes leaves states responsible for regulating technology transfers. States which develop advanced space technologies, as well as those with considerable political clout, can shape the existing system to suit their own national interests. Those states that possess domestic production capabilities in space technology can prevent the transfer of their own technologies, thereby securing a comparative advantage in outer space. Accordingly, the reliance upon export control regimes without any overarching governance structures contributes to a divide between large and small powers. States such as Russia, the United States, and the People’s Republic of China will continue to develop weapons for space, while those without their own production industries. The growing division between “have” and “have-not” states will undermine the norms developed by the regimes and diminish states’ willingness to participate in systems that do not serve their parochial national security interests. In doing so, it will exacerbate existing tensions within the regime, as states already struggle to achieve multilateral consensus regarding potential threats.21

ADDENDUM

Available data on members’ reporting of transfers calls into question the transparency and information-sharing utility of export control regimes. The Wassenaar Arrangement holds regular meetings to share information and develops a timeframe in which all participating members are expected to provide details on transfers. A 2002 report from the US Government Accountability Office, however, noted that nearly half of the Arrangement’s members did not submit information regarding denied export transfers.22

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Debate 3
SPACE EXPORTS AND CONTROLS

“Be it resolved that existing provisions under international export control regimes (e.g. the Wassenaar Arrangement) are sufficient to effectively regulate the export of sensitive space technologies.”

AGAINST
Argument presented by Sara Greco

Sara Greco is in the first year of her doctoral candidacy in political studies at Queen’s University, where she is working under the supervision of Dr. Stéfanie von Hlatky. Her research interests broadly include defense and security policy, diplomacy, global governance, international relations theory, international security, and nuclear (non)proliferation. Before attending Queen’s, Sara studied at the University of Western Ontario, where she acquired a Master of Arts in political science and an Honours Bachelor of Arts in political science and psychology. Sara graduated from her Master’s degree at the top of her cohort. Her Master’s major research paper examined America’s foreign policy towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear weapons program. For her doctoral dissertation, Sara will assess the utility of international relations theory for understanding the ability of states to achieve or not achieve their security related foreign policy goals, as well as explore the interaction of states’ diplomatic efforts and its impact on the achievement of their respective foreign policy goals.

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND

Currently, no international regime exists exclusively relating to the control of exports to outer space. Notwithstanding the absence of a supranational authority or international legislation vis-à-vis space export technologies, some states endeavour to coordinate their domestic policies, both bilaterally and regionally (Mineiro 13). The export of sensitive space technologies does however, fall under the purview of existing international export control regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Regime (1975), the Australia Group (1985), the Missile Technology Control Regime (1987), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (1996). The aforementioned regimes primarily aim to increase international security and stability by promoting the transparent and responsible transfers of material, equipment, and technology related to conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) (Beck 92). These international export control regimes are consensus-based, voluntary arrangements that aim to restrict the trade of sensitive material, equipment, and technologies useful in the development of WMDs or conventional weapons, in an effort to stop states and non-state actors from weapons proliferation.
The purpose of this position paper is to assert whether existing provisions under international export control regimes are sufficient to effectively regulate the export of sensitive space technologies. The first portion of this paper presents two main arguments to buttress the claim that existing international export control regimes are sufficient to regulate the export of sensitive space technologies, and discusses the past successes of the existing regimes and the strengths associated with having four regimes of similar focus. Second, this paper outlines two arguments that support the claim that existing international export control regimes cannot adequately control exports to space. Ultimately, the position upheld by this paper is that existing international regimes on export control are flawed, which will be explained in the third section of this paper. This paper concludes with negative and affirmative rebuttals to further enhance this paper’s central claim.

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR

The Existing International Export Control Regimes Have Been Successful

It is pertinent to note that these four existing export control regimes have yielded considerable success. These regimes have improved international cooperation in regulating and monitoring the trade of sensitive technologies, as well as harmonized the export control systems of major suppliers. In the absence of these internationally coordinated efforts, scholars and pundits prophesize that states such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Republic of Iraq, as well as non-state actors, would have more access to advanced and dangerous weaponry (Beck and Gahlaut). According to non-proliferation experts, the existing export control regimes have helped to “stop, slow, or raise costs” for states suspected of seeking to acquire WMDs. For example, the United States (US) Department of State asserts that the Missile Technology Control Regime has helped to reduce the number of states with ballistic missile programs.\(^1\) As well, the Nuclear Suppliers Group helped to convince Argentina and Brazil to halt their nuclear-related activities in exchange for expanded access to international cooperation for peaceful nuclear purposes (U.S. Department of Commerce).

The Four International Export Control Regimes are Effective in Concert

There are clear benefits associated with having multiple regimes that are similar in scope, such as an increase in member states’ compliance. Although these export control regimes do not require members to fully disclose which exports states have approved or denied, they expect members to report denials of export licenses for controlled dual-use items.\(^2\) By disclosing to the regimes the licenses a state has denied helps other regime members by providing them with the information necessary to avoid undercutting its export licensing decisions. It is true that member states are not always forthcoming and do not consistently provide complete information regarding their export denials to one regime. A state may not submit a self-report to all of the four regimes, however, given the four regimes are similar in scope and have consistent membership, there is a greater likelihood that member states will acquire pertinent report information relating to export control. For example, between 1996 and 2002, the US did not notify the Australia Group that it denied 27 licenses to export items controlled by the Australia Group to states including China, India, and Syria.\(^3\) However, the US did report multiple
ARGUMENTS AGAINST

**Security Concerns beyond WMDs in Outer Space Largely Remain Ignored**

Having the existing international export control regimes oversee the regulation of sensitive space technologies into outer space, inhibits actors from realizing security concerns in outer space that extend beyond WMDs. There are three main and distinct concerns that threaten the security of space: weaponization, space debris, and the overcrowding of orbit (The Simons Foundation). International export control regimes deal almost exclusively with only one of the three main concerns, that being the weaponization of outer space. The weaponization of outer space encompasses concerns including an arms race in outer space, space warfare, and the militarization of space. Security concerns relating to space debris require states to control the billions of small objects that circle Earth, which are a danger to spacecraft and satellites and cause light pollution. Overcrowding is also a pertinent threat to security, more specifically to the assets in space, as collisions in space may create conflict between states. Existing international export control regimes do not regulate issues associated with the security of outer space vis-à-vis space debris and overcrowding. For example, much like other states, China expresses strong sentiments in favour of nuclear non-proliferation in outer space, but does not advocate for the regulation of other sensitive materials and technologies in outer space, nor does it consider the need to secure outer space from space debris or orbit overcrowding. China opposes the development of anti-satellite weapons, argues for a complete ban on all weapons in outer space, and calls the international community to commence negotiations with the ultimate goal of formulating a legally binding international agreement on issues related to outer space (Zhao and Bian 107).

**Even when Supplemented with State Self-regulation, the International Export Control Regimes Remain Insufficient to Regulate the Export of Sensitive Space Technologies**

Dissimilar to many other states, Canada imposes stringent policies to effectively regulate the export of sensitive space technologies. The Canadian government states that it “tightly regulates the export of material, equipment and technology in the nuclear, chemical, and biological fields, and conventional weapons, as well as related dual-use goods and a number of additional strategic goods and technologies, such as sensitive space components.” Canada expresses a strong desire to ensure that exports are consistent with its foreign and defense policies, and as such, it will only export material, equipment, and technology to states that meet requirements relating to the arms control and non-proliferation of WMDs and conventional weapons (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada). The United States’ domestic export control reforms are pertinent examples of the prevalence of under regulation by states and its implications on the security of outer space. The commercial space industry in the US successfully sought to overturn particular export control restrictions that were enacted in the late 1990s. In December 2013, the US Congress passed a provision in their defense authorization bill, which removed satellites and satellite-related items from the United States Munitions List, notwithstanding that
prohibitions on the export of the aforementioned items to a number of other states remained on the bill (Foust). The deregulation efforts in the US illustrate the issues associated with relying on states to self-regulate, particularly in light of economic interests and implications.

RECOMMENDATION

In sum, the four existing international export control regimes are not sufficient to effectively regulate the export of sensitive space technologies. A separate international regime dedicated to regulating the export of sensitive space technologies will illuminate security issues in outer space that extend beyond weaponization. As well, a separate regime that complements the existing regimes will be specific enough that the international community will not have to rely as heavily on state self-regulation.

ADDENDUM

Negative Rebuttals

While it is the case that the existing export control regimes are amenable, as they include provisions for revision, these regimes have displayed an inability to remain relevant and adapt to new concerns in a timely manner. For example, advances in technology have not yielded changes in these multilateral regimes. As well, these regimes are ill equipped to engage with an increasingly complex international composition of state and non-state actors.

It is also possible to claim that the existing international export control regimes are ineffective because they animate and exacerbate a “North-South” divide. The assertion is that proverbial global ‘North’ insists on export controls are necessary for non-proliferation regimes to ensure international security, while the ‘South’ believe these regimes serve the interest of the ‘North’ (Latham and Bow 466).

It is also relevant to note that while the international community has formulated four regimes related to international export control, membership across these four regimes remains roughly the same. A factor that contributes to the successfulness of a regime is the quality and quantity of its membership. While newer regimes concerning export control materialized over time, they did not attract more membership.6

Affirmative Considerations

The existence of draft agreements concerning the export of sensitive materials to outer space speaks to a perceived need among the international community, to enact a legal regime that deals primarily with space exportation.7 In addition to the four international export control regimes, states seeking to formulate a legally-binding, international treaty on security in outer space have other useful resources and regimes including: the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (1963); the Outer Space Treaty (1967); the Space Security Index; and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (1967).
WORKS CITED


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1. More specifically, US Department State Officials suggest that the Missile Technology Control Regime contributed to the stemming of a number of sensitive ballistic missile programs in Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa, and has helped to slow missile development in India, Israel, the DPRK, and Pakistan.

2. Dual-use items connote materials, equipment, and technology that has the potential to be used for military purposes.

3. Of the 27 licenses that the US denied between 1996 and 2002, 15 license denials involved chemicals that could be used as precursors for toxic chemical agents and the remaining 12 involved other chemical or biological equipment and technology.

4. At the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly in 1996, China proposed a five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament: (1) major nuclear powers should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy, and the states having the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles, (2) all nuclear-weapon states should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally binding document as soon as possible, (3) all states which have deployed nuclear weapons outside their borders should withdraw all these weapons home, and all nuclear-weapon states should pledge to support the proposal on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations, (4) no state should develop or deploy outer space weapons or missile defense systems, which harm strategic security and stability, and (5) all states should negotiate and conclude an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
5. Canada determines whether it will export sensitive items by determining whether the export: (1) represents an unacceptable risk of diversion to a programme for the proliferation or delivery of WMDs, (2) is acceptable under national, multinational, and international principles, and (3) represents a risk to space security.

6. The Nuclear Suppliers Regime (1975), the Australia Group (1985), the Missile Technology Control Regime (1987), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (1996), has memberships of: 40, 33, 33, and 33, respectively.

7. The two draft agreements concerning exportation to outer space are: the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (2014), and the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat of Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (2014).
Debate 4

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

“Be it resolved that Nuclear Cooperation Agreements are an essential part of the international architecture governing nuclear materials and technologies as articulated by the peaceful uses provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

IN FAVOUR

Argument presented by Brent Gerchicoff

Brent Gerchicoff is a PhD candidate at Concordia University. Focusing on Security and Strategic Studies, especially Foreign Policy. Brent has published articles on nuclear caution between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in the Journal of Defense Studies and an evaluation of UN Capstone Peacekeeping Doctrine in the Journal of Strategic Analysis, a co-authored chapter on trade and political reconstruction in Afghanistan. Brent has a forthcoming chapter on Indian-Pakistani military doctrine in an upcoming Routledge Handbook on Asian Politics. Additionally, Brent has participated in several conferences, including the International Political Science Association 23rd World Congress, the 73rd Midwest Political Science Association Conference in Chicago, Illinois, the 65th annual New York State Political Science Association Conference, the annual Research Group in International Security, and a round-table panel discussion on the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan Security (with a focus on the training and mentoring of Afghan National Security Forces) sponsored by the Department of National Defense (DND) and chaired by Brigadier-General Richard Giguere. He is a member of the Research Committee on Asian and Pacific Studies at the International Political Science Association. Brent's MA work was on the technological determinants of nuclear doctrine, ‘The Rockets’ Red Glare: The Impact of Technology on U.S. Nuclear Strategy from Eisenhower to Carter.’ Brent is pursuing a doctoral dissertation on containment foreign policies, nuclear doctrine, and nuclear proliferation.

BACKGROUND

In Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968/1995, nuclear weapon states (NWS) promise not to assist non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) in obtaining nuclear weapons, who in turn pledge not receive or develop nuclear weapons in Article II.1 The origins of the NPT can be traced back to the "German Question," and Moscow's fear that the U.S. would share nuclear weapons with West Germany, which led to the promise of extended deterrence from the Washington to Germany.2 The NPT attempts to stabilize and reduce arms competition, offsetting the "natural tendency to diffuse military technology."3 While some argue that "peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation are causally connected,"4 others argue that Nuclear Cooperation Agreements strengthen the NPT regime and help stem the tide of proliferation.5

Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCA) are primarily an extension of the Nonproliferation regime, while giving NNWS access to nuclear power. NCAs seek to control nuclear and dual-use items through national regulations, sign legally-binding commitments limiting nuclear material to peaceful usage, and adherence to IAEA safeguards.6 The 123 agreement7 (of the US Atomic
Energy Act) outlines the safeguards, guarantee of peaceful use, "adequate" physical security of nuclear material, and the consequence of demanding the return of enriched uranium for violation. The 123 establishes the conditions for nuclear cooperation.

Given that NCA is an extension of the NPT regime, it is important to explore a major reason why states acquire nuclear weapons. The supply-side argues states build nuclear weapons because they have the opportunity, as windows open (technological, economic). If the supply-side thesis is correct (there is strong statistical evidence to suggest this), then giving access to nuclear technologies and materials dangerously increases the risks/chance of proliferation.

The intentions of states change over time. States will calculate cost/benefits before acting, and because their geostrategic situation and capabilities change, intentions and motives are fluid. This has profound implications for treaties, as a state signing an agreement may change their goals and intentions over time. Furthermore, decisionmakers signing an agreement today will not be the same actors a decade into the future.

ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR

"Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of nuclear destruction under international control - a goal first sought in 1946." - President John F. Kennedy, July 1963.

The NPT attempts to stabilize and reduce arms competition, offsetting the "natural tendency to diffuse military technology." It is only in rare cases that military technology is prevented from spreading; cases such as the Hittites, who held a monopoly on iron for 500 years. We cannot expect such a monopoly will last even a fraction of that time. But what can be done to delay and, indeed, stabilize the spread of such a devastating military technology? I will argue that Nuclear Cooperation Agreements are an essential part of the international architecture governing nuclear materials and technologies, as articulated by the peaceful uses provisions of the NPT. This is for three reasons: (1) the reinforcement and strengthening of NPT norms; (2) Increasing safeguards and credible assurances against weapons proliferation; and (3) NCAs continually reaffirm tacit agreements not to share nuclear weapon technology.

Firstly, NCAs reinforce and strengthen NPT norms. Norms order and constrain behavior, while norm-breaking generates disapproval or stigma; norm-conforming produces praise or the norm is taken-for-granted (internalized) that it provokes no reaction. Where there is broad consensus that states ought not acquire nuclear weapons, proliferators risk both shunning and foregoing the opportunity costs of compliance. While the original version of the NPT did not include Article VI calling for disarmament, NNWS demanded its inclusion, as fear of nuclear weapons increased (however, these states insisted on the right to nuclear energy). At the 1995 NPT Review Conference more than 65 NGOs were active in diffusing the taboo associated with proliferation by applying pressure in various forms. The diffusion of NPT norms by various norm entrepreneurs has increased in recent years, for example: the EU has tied Trade and Cooperation Agreements to states' nonproliferation status. The 123 agreement with the United Arab Emirates illustrated that complying with nonproliferation conditions asked of them will result in the benefits of nuclear sharing, "legitimizing [the] economic case for nuclear power." In preparation of a U.S.-PRC NCA in 1985, China accepted nonproliferation practices and norms, such as joining the IAEA and quickly implementing safeguards. China's previous policy had been to reject the basic norms of nonproliferation. These NCAs serve to
demonstrate conforming to NPT norms will be beneficial, while deviants (such as Iran and DPRK) will be treated as "rogues" and incur sanctions.\(^\text{23}\)

Secondly, Nuclear Cooperation Agreement increases safeguards. According to the IAEA, the role of the Department of Safeguards is to deter weapons proliferation "by providing credible assurances that States are honouring their international obligations...and by being able to detect early any misuse of nuclear material or technology, thereby alerting the world to potential proliferation."\(^\text{24}\) Preconditions for the 123 agreement and Canada's NCA include adhering to IAEA safeguards covering major nuclear facilities,\(^\text{25}\) especially in terms of safeguarding access to spent uranium and "plutonium diversion" that can be used to make weapons.\(^\text{26}\) Major suppliers at "crucial points in the fuel cycle [are few]," as Canada, U.S., and South Africa accounted for approximately 80% of non-Communist uranium production.\(^\text{27}\) Therefore, NNWS have high incentives to adhere to the preconditions of NCAs. We have already seen how effective this clause is in the China example above. Additionally, the UAE 123 agreement contains a stipulation that includes a "multilateral system that regulates the civilian nuclear fuel cycle," which opens up IAEA inspections and creates incentives for fuel transfers.\(^\text{28}\) Taiwan's NCA with the U.S. and IAEA Safeguards Agreement (1996), broadens the inspection scope from 'nuclear material' to 'nuclear-related activity,' restricting Taiwan's ability to cheat; furthermore, the agreements have helped to ensure Taiwan meets nuclear obligations (inspector reports, and confidence-building measures).\(^\text{29}\)

Thirdly, NCAs continually reaffirm tacit agreements not to share nuclear weapons technology among allies and between adversaries. The NPT treaty was itself set up to affirm commitment to stem proliferation to West Germany and pacify Moscow's fear that would likely have led to sharing among Warsaw Pact states. Similarly, bilateral treaties reaffirmed American commitment to non-sharing with Japan via the McMahon Act, later the 123 Agreement.\(^\text{30}\) Absence of Cooperative Agreements have created a destabilized environment, greatly increasing potential proliferation. Case in point is nuclear proliferation in Asia and the Subcontinent. Washington support Beijing to balance Russia, without bilateral agreements the PRC shared nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. Before the PRC supported the NPT in the 1990s, Pakistan received bomb design feedback in 1982, China provided 20kt warhead design in '83, and tested a warhead design at a Chinese site in 1990.\(^\text{31}\) Similarly, China provided late 1980s technology to North Korea for the Scud and No Dong rockets, as well as supplying dual-use chemical and plutonium processing facilities.\(^\text{32}\) Lastly, the PRC signed a secret agreement with Iran in 1985 supplying four research reactors, fissile material, expertise in uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment.\(^\text{33}\)

**ARGUMENT AGAINST**

Firstly, NCAs pre-empt the need to build nuclear facilities and technologies when extended deterrence is insufficient.\(^\text{34}\) In 1959, Israel was producing only lab quantities of heavy water until the processing facility, Dimona opened.\(^\text{35}\) Nuclear bombs would not have been possible without Norway selling 20 tons. Crucially, the NCA that covered Israeli-Norwegian nuclear sharing stipulated IAEA inspections as a safeguard.\(^\text{36}\) While not all NNWS who receive aid become NWS, most proliferation occurs after receiving aid. North Korean scientists received training from the USSR in the 1950s-1960s, and built a nuclear installation in the 1980s.\(^\text{37}\) India's nuclear weapons project stemmed from designs by British, Canadian research reactors, and technical training from the United States.\(^\text{38}\) Furthermore, the dual-use application of nuclear technology allowed decisionmakers a window of opportunity of lowered costs to proliferate, when the previous Prime Minister rejected the idea because of economic disadvantage -- NCAs lowered infrastructure costs, making the bomb feasible.\(^\text{39}\) Pakistan underwent the same calculus, having
had their nuclear scientists trained at the same American laboratory.\(^{40}\) Once A.Q. Khan stole centrifuge technology designs from the Dutch, they had the infrastructure and training in place to develop a nuclear weapons program (with help from Chinese-supplied uranium).\(^{41}\) While governments may sign NCAs declaring intentions not to become NWS, future intentions may change. This is apparent in case studies, as Pakistan, India, and North Korea decided to develop bombs decades after receiving aid. The problem is that the government signing the NCA is not deciding to become a NWS.

Secondly, NCAs eliminate incentives for nuclear reduction as outlined in the NPT and have no reduction procedure, and therefore block long term commitment in the NPT to abolish nuclear weapons. The 123 agreement, removes an opportunity cost in Indian uranium production, since there is only enough for either energy or weapons, the 123 makes it possible for India to move its own U235 to bombs and to import its energy requirements.\(^{42}\) China is seeking an NCA to buy reactors for uranium from Canada, US, France, and Australia which will enable them “to free up its domestic uranium for nuclear weapons.”\(^{43}\)

Thirdly, NCAs encourage the use of nuclear power, which is dangerous even with environmental safeguards. Canada determines the partner state’s ability to enforce environmental standards and their commitment to adhere to international environmental obligations,\(^{44}\) but “the safeguard system might not impede the movement of materials through the fuel cycle.”\(^{45}\) Partners may accumulate their plutonium stocks which could be used for weapons. By signing civil nuclear agreements, the use of nuclear energy is being given legitimacy as an appropriate means of power.\(^{46}\) However, as we have seen recently, even the highly regulated Japanese Fukushima plant led to environmental disaster.

**RECOMMENDATION**

A major problem is that proliferation occurs from supply-side opportunities and that recipient governments signing NCAs are not the ones deciding to develop weapons: intentions change over time. While most states that sign NCAs comply with the nonproliferation regime, virtually all NWS have stemmed from sharing agreements. This negates the primary goal of NCAs, which were designed to promote the NPT. With this in mind, the conditions of NCAs must be revisited. Agreements should only be signed with states that have established a long track-record of political stability, strong political institutions, and compliance with international law. Strong institutions and temporal stability may illustrate more fixed intentions, as complex institutions make it more difficult to alter intentions. A state with long-standing stability is less likely to defect from treaties and break nonproliferation norms. Furthermore, these preconditions to sharing nuclear energy also act as an additional incentive or side-payment for following international law and norms.

**ADDENDUM: Additional Rebuttal Points**

The declared goal of NCAs is to strengthen the NPT regime, leading to positive cooperation for nonproliferation, safety, and security. In the years since the US-India 123 agreement, however, the NPT regime has been severely weakened. In 2009, Pakistan blocked negotiations on fissile material production limitation stipulated in signed treaties; Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa refused to endorse tougher inspections as a pre-condition for nuclear commerce at the 2010 NPT review, and China agreed to sell Pakistan two additional nuclear power plants, ignoring rules and procedures of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.\(^{47}\) Additionally, safeguards are likely to be accepted by states that are least likely to divert spent fuel to weapons projects.\(^{48}\)
With the help of International Organizations, the strength of the NPT is in setting standards of acceptable behavior -- norms -- and providing a mechanism for monitoring compliance. The IAEA provides the safeguard mechanism, where states willingly submit to inspection. IAEA inspection uncovered evidence of plutonium diversion in North Korea in the 1990s, delaying proliferation; documented Iranian noncompliance for several decades, and referring Security Council sanctions. Number of signatories has grown from 61 in 1970 to 189; States who had refused to sign have become new members, such as South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina. Instances of cheating by NPT signatories has been exceedingly rare, and IAEA inspection regime has provided safeguards to dramatically reduce the potential of occurrence, and an early warning system to actively sanction and block proliferators.

Additionally, bilateral cooperative agreements have built in safeguards to prevent states from weapons proliferation. Canadian nuclear arms cooperation agreements set strict guidelines to control exports, including licenses, legally binding agreements, and acceptance of the full scope safeguards by the IAEA. Canada retains control over reprocessing of dual-use nuclear fuel, as well as the storage of plutonium, and assurance of physical protection measures. In short, NCAs and IOs make peaceful nuclear use safer than if sharing did not exist.

**CLOSING STATEMENT**

According to the United Nations, the proliferation of nuclear weapons represents the greatest threat to global security. According to military theorist Herman Kahn, "the widespread diffusion of nuclear weapons would make many nations able, and in some cases also create the pressure, to aggravate an on-going crisis, or even touch off a war between two other powers." The argument I presented today has been that cooperative agreements and treaties present international society with the greatest potential to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, leading to the eventual disarmament goal outlined in the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty, made at the height of the Cold War.

My closing statements will focus on recommendations for ensuring nuclear cooperative agreements have the greatest impact in halting the spread of atomic weapons. Proliferation, according to the most recent scholarship, occurs from supply side opportunities; open windows of economic and technological opportunity, and intentions may change in the future. The preconditions of nuclear sharing, therefore, must be strengthened. Agreements should be signed when states have established a long track-record of political stability to help prevent WMDs from falling into terrorist hands. NCAs should be concluded with states who have strong political institutions, which ensures stability of intentions over time as altering purposes becomes more difficult, especially with democratic and complex institutions. Lastly, NCAs should only be signed with states with a long history of complying with international law, ensuring perpetuation with the nonproliferation regime. A state with long-standing stability is less likely to defect from treaties and break NPT norms and these preconditions to obtaining nuclear energy should be an incentive or side-payment for following international law and global norms in a non-nuclear international society.

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7 The 123 agreement comes from Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, outlining the processes for nuclear cooperation between the United States and other states.


14 While the opportunity costs associated with acquiring nuclear weapons may take the form of economic sanctions or military action, a social-psychology approach found in the Constructivist paradigm demonstrates that further ideational opportunity costs are present. When states deviate or defect from strongly held norms, such as those found in the nonproliferation regime, the consequences may vary: they may be considered a rogue or pariah state, unsuitable for other cooperative endeavours (lest the international community associate them too strongly with the state that has broken the norm), the norm-breaking state may be shamed and ostracized by the international community in various forms (from the United Nations General Assembly to the Security Council, or publically chastised by various national legislatures or media) and undergo serious reputational damage.


Qingshan Tan, "U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: China’s Nonproliferation Policy," *Asian Survey*, vol. 29, no. 9 (September 1989): 879. Furthermore, China implemented safeguards on nuclear exports to NNWS in 1984 when the PRC entered into a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Brazil, as outlined by the IAEA (ibid).


Furthermore, the NPT regime has linked nonproliferation to other issue areas, including trade (as seen in the EU Trade example).

http://www.iaea.org/safeguards


Center for Strategic and International Studies, "The UAE 123 Agreement: A Model for the Region?" (October 23, 2009).


Schofield (2014).

Kroenig (2009).

Ibid.

Ibid.

Countries such as Taiwan (ROC) have benefitted from the American deterrence umbrella since the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, as well as West Germany and France during the Cold War. However, even these crucial cases of the nuclear umbrella have been called into question, as the U.S. has repeatedly questioned their commitments to the ROC being in American regional security interests; West Germany was not satisfied until Pershing rockets were deployed by NATO in 1965; and France developed *force de frappe*. Earl C. Raval, "Approaching China, Defending Taiwan," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 50, no. 1 (October 1971) :44;Schofield (2014): 33; Malcolm W. Hoag, "Nuclear Policy and French Intransigence," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 41, no. 2 (January 1963): 289; Henry A. Kissinger, "Coalition Diplomacy in a Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 42, no. 4 (July 1964): 525-545; Andrew J. Pierre, "Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 49, no. 2 (January 1971): 283-301.


Norway now claims, with a great deal of evidence, that Israel has shirked the inspection precondition that it signed onto in the NCA, and there has been very little the Norwegians have been able to do to convince Israel to comply. Michael R. Gordon, "Norway Says Israel Resists a Nuclear Check," *The New York Times* (May 26, 1987).


42 Furthermore, in the years since the US-India 123 agreement, the NPT regime has been severely weakened. In 2009, Pakistan blocked negotiations on fissile material production limitation stipulated in signed treaties; Brazil, Egypt, and South Africa refused to endorse tougher inspections as a pre-condition to nuclear commerce at the 2010 NPT review; China agreed to sell Pakistan two additional nuclear power plants, ignoring rules and procedures of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

43 T.V. Paul, "The US-India Nuclear Accord: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime," *International Journal*, vol. 62, no. 4 India Emerging: Strength and Challenge (Autumn 2007): 853. Furthermore, these countries (Canada, France, the United States, and Australia) have been actively courting the PRC to sign a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to sell them Uranium reactors.


45 Keeley: 617.

46 Countries who sign a NCA may do so under the precondition that they will develop a satisfactory regulatory framework, but have not done so as yet. Vietnam, for example, who is in the final process of signing a nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States (a Memorandum of Understanding to this effect was signed on 6 May 2014) has not yet completed adequate safety standards and regulatory practices (although they are working with the IAEA to develop this). However, this has yet to come to fruition and Vietnam remains geographically one of the highest risks for a tsunami and climate change, therefore it is especially critical that Vietnam’s preparedness and risk assessment for nuclear power plants needs to be higher than most nuclear energy states. Yet the 123 agreement has been signed by the United States before this has been completed. Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Mark Holt, Mark E. Manyin, "U.S. - Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Services* (September 15, 2014): 10. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43433.pdf.


Debate 4
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

“Be it resolved that Nuclear Cooperation Agreements are an essential part of the international architecture governing nuclear materials and technologies as articulated by the peaceful uses provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

AGAINST
Argument presented by Jean-François Bélanger

Jean-François Bélanger is currently a doctoral student in Political Science at McGill University. He is the recipient of a Joseph Armand Bombardier SSHRC award. He completed his undergraduate degree at Concordia University and a masters degree at Dalhousie University, both in political science. He has edited two books with David Beitelman for the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. His research interests broadly center on international security with a focus on nuclear proliferation, coercive diplomacy, Globalization and the use of force, as well as trust formation issues in IR.

TEXT OF PRESENTATION NOT AVAILABLE
Expert Review Panel

Andrea Berger is the Deputy Director of the Proliferation and Nuclear Policy programme at RUSI and a Senior Research Fellow. Her research interests include counter-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and Korean Peninsula security issues. Andrea is the Deputy Director for the UK Project on Nuclear Issues (UK PONI) and a contributor at NK News. Prior to joining RUSI, Andrea worked in non-proliferation research and analysis at the International Centre for Security Analysis. She has also worked for the Government of Canada in a number of analytical capacities, lastly in the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. Andrea holds MA in International Peace and Security from the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, a BA in Political Science from Carleton University in Ottawa, as well as a certificate in Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation from the European Safeguards Research and Development Association.

Alexandra Gheciu is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and Associate Director of the Centre for International Policy Studies. Her research interests are in the fields of international security, international institutions, Euro-Atlantic relations, global governance, state (re)building, and International Relations theory. Prior to joining the University of Ottawa, she was a Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, and a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence. She has also been a senior research associate with the Changing Character of War Programme (Oxford University), a visiting professor at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, and is currently an associate fellow of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI, London). In addition, she has served as associate editor for the US-based journal Security Studies.

Christopher Penny joined the NPSIA faculty in July 2004 as Assistant Professor of International Law. Prior to joining the full-time faculty, he taught as a sessional lecturer at NPSIA as well as at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law (where he also coordinated the International Law program). Professor Penny is a member in good standing of the Law Society of Upper Canada. In addition to his position at NPSIA, he is also a reserve legal officer (Army Lieutenant-Colonel) with the Canadian Forces, serving in the Directorate of International and Operational Law in the Office of the Judge Advocate General. In addition to his academic work, Professor Penny also has substantial practical experience with the development and application of international law in this field. He has participated as a member of the Canadian government delegation to numerous multilateral treaty negotiations, both within and outside of the United Nations framework, and has also provided legal advice in operational military environments relating to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Libya.
Graduate Research Awards (GRA) Debates 2014-2015

February 20^{th} 2015, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa

09:00 Opening Plenary
Skelton Lobby

Opening Remarks/Mot de bienvenue
Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons, President, The Simons Foundation

09:30 Debate Session 1 (with Q&A) / Séance de débat 1

DEBATE #1
Arms Control (WMD and conventional) in Conflict Zones and Non-permissive Environments
Skelton Lobby

“Be it resolved that effective arms control is a necessary component and precondition for a sustainable peace settlement.”

IN FAVOUR:
William Leurer, Carleton University

AGAINST:
Khalid Mahdi, University of Toronto

DEBATE #2
Non-proliferation and Disarmament
B1-301

“Be it resolved that Cold War era instruments are sufficient in achieving crucial nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives in the current post-Cold War international context.”

IN FAVOUR:
Jinelle Piereder, Balsillie School of International Affairs

AGAINST:
Dylan Gagnon, Carleton University
10:15  Health Break  
Skelton Lobby

10:30  Debate Session 2 (with Q&A) / Séance de débat 2

DEBATE #3  
Space and Export Controls  
Skelton Lobby

"Be it resolved that existing provisions under international export control regimes (e.g. the Wassenaar Arrangement) are sufficient to effectively regulate the export of sensitive space technologies."

IN FAVOUR:  
Susan Colbourne, University of Toronto

AGAINST:  
Sara Greco, University of Western Ontario

DEBATE #4  
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements  
B1-301

"Be it resolved that Nuclear Cooperation Agreements are an essential part of the international architecture governing nuclear materials and technologies as articulated by the peaceful uses provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

IN FAVOUR:  
Brent Gerchicoff, Concordia University

AGAINST:  
Jean-François Bélanger, McGill University

11:15  Meeting of the Awards Committee

11:30  Closing Remarks and Announcement of GRA Debate Winners  
Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons, President, The Simons Foundation

11:45  Lunch for Graduate Research Award Recipients
Debate Format:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Side A</th>
<th>Opening statements</th>
<th>6 minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Side B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Side A</td>
<td>A’s first rebuttal</td>
<td>2 minutes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Side B</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>2 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Side B</td>
<td>B’s first Rebuttal</td>
<td>2 minutes</td>
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<td>Side A</td>
<td>Response</td>
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<td>Side A</td>
<td>A’s second rebuttal</td>
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<td>Side B</td>
<td>Response</td>
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<td>Side B</td>
<td>B’s second rebuttal</td>
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<td>Side A</td>
<td>Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>Side B</td>
<td>Closing statements</td>
<td>3 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Side A</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximate Total: 35 minutes

- Each debate will be approximately 35 minutes in duration, followed by a 10 minute Q & A. Two debates will be held concurrently in separate rooms (Robertson and Skelton Rooms).

- Each debate will begin with students’ opening statements (6 minutes x 2).

- Following the opening statements, there will be two (2) rounds of rebuttals and responses (2 minutes for each student x 4).

- Each side will give a closing statement (3 minutes x 2)
Annex II

COMPETITION DETAILS

Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (GRA) 2014-2015 are offered by The Simons Foundation and The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada (DFATD).

The primary objective of the Graduate Research Awards is to enhance Canadian graduate level scholarship on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues.

A total of eight awards of Cdn$3,000 will be available to Canadian Masters and/or Doctoral students to support the research and writing of short position papers that will be presented at the Graduate Research Awards (GRA) Debates in Ottawa hosted by DFATD. Awards include travel support to Ottawa (domestic transportation, accommodation, and meals) where successful candidates will be invited to present their completed position papers in the form of a one-to-one debate during a special event at DFATD in February 2015. For applicants pursuing studies abroad, a limited number of Canadian international students' travel costs may be covered.

Deadline for applications: October 27, 2014
Selection of short-listed candidates: December 3, 2014
Deadline for position papers: January 5, 2014
Selection of eight award recipients: February 4, 2015

HOW TO APPLY:

Applications should be sent to Elaine Hynes at The Simons Foundation by email to: ehynes@thesimonsfoundation.ca by the close of business (PST) on October 27, 2014. Hard copies of official transcripts and other documents may be sent to follow by mail. Your application must include:

- An introductory letter of interest that supports your candidacy for the GRA programme.
- A writing sample (up to 1,500 words) that addresses non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) issues.
- Your resume, including proof of citizenship status.
- A complete, official transcript of your grades.
- A letter of reference from your supervisor.
- A second letter of reference.

Note: Letters of reference may be faxed or scanned and sent by email but should be shown on letterhead and include the writer's signature.
ELIGIBILITY:

Canadian citizens and Canadian permanent residents/landed immigrants are eligible to apply, including Canadian graduate students currently studying abroad. Previous recipients of a Graduate Research Award are eligible to apply, but priority will be given to students who have not already participated in the programme in order to expand the community of Canadian scholars working on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) issues.

SELECTION PROCESS:

Following the initial review of applications, up to 16 candidates will be short-listed for further consideration. Applicants will be advised by December 3, 2014 if they have been short-listed. Each of the short-listed candidates will be assigned one of the four pre-determined debate topics (see below) and will be required to research and write, individually and independently, a 1,000 to 1,500 word position paper arguing in favour or against, as instructed. Suggested reading lists for each topic will be provided, along with a position paper template. Position papers must be submitted by January 5, 2015. Short-listed applicants may be re-assigned a debate topic for presentation at the GRA debates, to ensure appropriate debate pairings. The eight students whose position papers make the strongest argument for their assigned position, and are chosen to receive the award, will be notified by February 4, 2015.

GRA DEBATES:

Award winners will be invited to present their positions at the GRA Debates hosted by DFATD in Ottawa in February 2015. At the debates, an additional monetary award of $1,000 will be presented to the students who make the most effective arguments in support of their positions in each of the four debates. The debates will be subject to the Chatham House Rule and a report of the GRA Debates, including the position papers presented, will be published online by The Simons Foundation. Please note that attendance at the GRA Debates is a mandatory requirement of the award. Travel, accommodation and meal expenses will be provided by ISROP, in accordance with Government of Canada Treasury Board Guidelines and with the supplementary support of The Simons Foundation, if required.

GRA DEBATE TOPICS* for 2014-2015:

Debate #1: Arms Control (WMD and conventional) in Conflict Zones and Non-permissive Environments
In favour vs Against
Be it resolved that effective arms control is a necessary component and precondition for a sustainable peace settlement.

Debate #2: Non-proliferation and Disarmament
In favour vs Against
Be it resolved that Cold War era instruments are sufficient in achieving crucial nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives in the current post-Cold War international context.
Debate #3: Space and Export Controls
In favour vs Against
Be it resolved that existing provisions under international export control regimes (e.g. the Wassenaar Arrangement) are sufficient, to effectively regulate the export of sensitive space technologies.

Debate #4: Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
In favour vs. Against
Be it resolved that the conclusion of a bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA), resting on the inclusion of certain preconditions, can have a net positive result for nuclear non-proliferation, for nuclear safety and security objectives, and for broader regional security goals.

*Positions will be assigned to the short-listed candidates; Each topic will require arguments “for” and “against”.

Disclaimer: The views and positions expressed through the GRA programme are intended to stimulate academic debates as part of an annual youth education partnership jointly organized by The Simons Foundation and ISROP; the themes do not necessarily reflect the views of The Simons Foundation, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada or the Government of Canada.
BOURSES DE RECHERCHE AUX CYCLES SUPÉRIEURS (BRCS) pour le désarmement, le contrôle des armements et la non-prolifération 2014-2015

DÉTAILS DE L’APPEL DE CANDIDATURES

Les Bourses de recherche aux cycles supérieurs pour le désarmement, le contrôle des armements et la non-prolifération 2014-2015 sont décernées par The Simons Foundation et le Programme de recherche et d'information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale (PRISI) du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international (MAECD).

L’objectif premier de ces bourses consiste à accroître la recherche aux cycles supérieurs sur les enjeux liés au désarmement, au contrôle des armements et à la non-prolifération.

Au total, huit bourses de 3 000 $CAN seront décernées à des étudiants canadiens à la maîtrise ou au doctorat pour leur permettre d'effectuer de la recherche et de rédiger des courts énoncés de position. Ces énoncés seront présentés à l’occasion des Débats des bourses de recherche aux cycles supérieurs (BRCS), organisés à Ottawa par le ministère des Affaires étrangères, du Commerce et du Développement (MAECD). Les bourses comprennent les frais de déplacement pour venir à Ottawa (transport intérieur, hébergement et repas), où les candidats sélectionnés seront invités à présenter, sous forme de débat, leur exposé de position à l'occasion d'une rencontre spéciale qui se tiendra au MAECD en février 2015. En ce qui concerne les candidats qui poursuivent des études à l'étranger, les étudiants canadiens pourraient avoir droit au remboursement de certains frais de déplacement.

Date limite pour l’appel de candidatures : le 27 octobre 2014
Présélection des candidats : le 3 décembre 2014
Date limite pour la présentation des énoncés : le 5 janvier 2014
Sélection des huit boursiers : le 4 février 2015

COMMENT POSER SA CANDIDATURE

Vous devez adresser votre demande de participation à Mme Elaine Hynes de The Simons Foundation par courrier électronique (ehynes@thesimonsfoundation.ca) d’ici le 27 octobre 2014, avant la fin des heures de bureau (HNP). Vous pourrez ensuite envoyer par la poste la version papier des relevés officiels et des autres documents. Les dossiers de candidature doivent comprendre :

- Une lettre de présentation à l’appui de votre candidature au programme des BRCS;
- Un échantillon de texte de 1 500 mots sur des enjeux liés à la non-prolifération, au contrôle des armements et au désarmement;
- Un curriculum vitae, y compris une preuve de citoyenneté;
- Un relevé de notes officiel et complet;
- Une lettre de recommandation de votre directeur de thèse;
- Une deuxième lettre de référence.
ADMISSIBILITÉ

Les citoyens canadiens ainsi que les résidents permanents/immigrants reçus peuvent poser leur candidature, y compris les diplômés canadiens qui poursuivent actuellement des études à l’étranger. Les anciens boursiers du programme BRCS peuvent aussi poser leur candidature, mais la priorité sera accordée aux étudiants qui n’y ont pas encore participé. L’objectif consiste, en effet, à accroître le nombre de chercheurs canadiens qui étudient les enjeux liés à la non-prolifération, au contrôle des armements et au désarmement (NCAD)

PROCESSUS DE SÉLECTION

Au terme du premier examen des demandes de candidature, jusqu’à 16 candidats feront l’objet d’une présélection. Les candidats présélectionnés en seront informés d’ici le 3 décembre 2014. Chacun d’eux se verra attribuer l’un des quatre thèmes à l’ordre du jour des débats (voir ci-dessous) et devra effectuer de la recherche et rédiger, à titre individuel et en autonomie, un énoncé de position de 1 000 à 1 500 mots. Ils devront plaider en faveur ou contre les positions présentées, conformément aux instructions reçues. Une bibliographie sera proposée pour chaque thème, ainsi qu’un modèle d’énoncé de position. Ces énoncés doivent être présentés d’ici le 5 janvier. Afin d’assurer une répartition adéquate des débats, il se peut que les candidats présélectionnés se voient attribuer un autre thème en vue des Débats des BRCS. Les huit étudiants qui présenteront les arguments les plus convaincants, et auxquels seront attribuées les bourses, seront informés de leur sélection d’ici le 4 février 2015.

DÉBATS des BRCS

Les lauréats des bourses seront invités à présenter leurs énoncés aux Débats des BRCS, organisés en février 2015 à Ottawa, sous l’égide du MAEC. À cette occasion, il est prévu de décerner une autre bourse de 1 000 $ aux étudiants qui auront présenté les arguments les plus convaincants pour défendre leurs positions dans chacun des quatre débats. Ceux-ci se dérouleront conformément à la règle de « Chatham House ». La Simons Foundation diffusera en ligne un compte rendu de ces discussions. Prière de noter que les boursiers sélectionnés doivent obligatoirement participer aux Débats des BRCS. Les frais de déplacement, l’hébergement et les repas seront à la charge du PRISI, conformément aux directives applicables du Conseil du Trésor du gouvernement du Canada et, au besoin, grâce à une aide financière supplémentaire de la Simons Foundation.

THÈME DES DÉBATS DBRCS 2014-2015*

Premier débat : Contrôle des armements (armes classiques et de destruction massive [ADM]) dans les zones de conflit et des environnements non permissifs
En faveur ou contre
Il est entendu qu’un contrôle efficace des armements constitue un aspect et une condition préalable nécessaires à un règlement de paix durable.
Deuxième débat : Non-prolifération et désarmement

\textit{En faveur ou contre}

Il est entendu que les outils adoptés pendant la guerre froide suffisent pour réaliser des objectifs cruciaux en matière de non-prolifération et de désarmement nucléaires dans le contexte international actuel de l’après-guerre froide.

Troisième débat : Technologies spatiales et contrôle à l’exportation

\textit{En faveur ou contre}

Il est entendu que les dispositions existantes des régimes internationaux de contrôle à l’exportation (par exemple l’Arrangement de Wassenaar) suffisent pour réguler efficacement l’exportation de technologies spatiales sensibles.

Quatrième débat : Accords de coopération nucléaire

\textit{En faveur ou contre}

Il est entendu que la conclusion d’un accord de coopération nucléaire (ACN) bilatéral, avec l’ajout de certaines conditions préalables, peut se traduire par une contribution nette à l’atteinte des objectifs de non-prolifération, de sûreté et de sécurité nucléaires, et des objectifs de sécurité régiona de portée plus générale.

*Les thèmes seront assignés aux candidats présélectionnés; pour chaque thème, ceux-ci devront présenter des arguments « en faveur » et « contre ».

\textit{Avis de non-responsabilité :} Les points de vue et les positions exprimés dans le cadre du programme BRCS visent à susciter un débat entre les chercheurs, dans le cadre d’un programme annuel de partenariat au profit des jeunes diplômés. Ces débats sont organisés conjointement par The Simons Foundation et le PRISI. Les thèmes à l’ordre du jour ne représentent pas nécessairement le point de vue de la Simons Foundation, d’Affaires étrangères, Commerce et Développement Canada (MAECD) ni du gouvernement du Canada.