Arctic Security and the Canadian Defence Policy Statement of 2017

The Government’s long-awaited defence policy statement, which arrived last Spring, sensibly portrays Arctic security challenges as rooted largely in significant public safety challenges rather than in traditional, or primarily military, challenges to the defence of Canada. The Arctic operations of the Canadian Armed Forces thus focus on aiding civilian authorities, rather than on deterring or responding to state-based security threats. One essential dimension of sustainable Arctic security that does not receive adequate attention is the imperative, and the opportunity, to consciously shape the northern circumpolar arena into a durable regional security community by building on and reinforcing the current and fortunate absence of any state actors bent on militarily harming other Arctic states.

Especially since the famous 1987 Murmansk speech of Mikhail Gorbachev, international discourse on Arctic security has tended toward an exceptionalist framework. The assumption, or at least the hope, has been that the North’s geographic isolation and unique climate support its political isolation and largely shield it from the tensions and competition that dominate other regions of major power presence. The harsh conditions and unique circumstances of the Arctic have driven cooperation, it is argued, regardless of events and conflicts elsewhere. Russian President Vladimir Putin made the point in 2010 that cooperation is not only desirable but necessary in the Arctic: "If you stand alone you can't survive in the Arctic.” More recently he told a Russian conference that it is essential to “maintain the Arctic as a space of peace, stability and mutual cooperation.” The former Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, discounted the prospects for military competition or conflict in the Arctic by famously saying that "if someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, [the] first task would be to rescue them.”

Of course, this beneficent Arctic exceptionalism is not universally assumed, and it is not surprising that Finns have been among those inclined to challenge the paradigm. In 2015 the Finnish Institute for International Affairs published what it called “critical reflections on Arctic exceptionalism,” arguing in effect that what happens in Ukraine doesn’t stay in Ukraine – that events in other parts of the world do spill over into the Arctic neighborhood. The paper argues that “before the crisis in Ukraine, the increase in Russian Arctic [military] capabilities was widely interpreted as legitimate state behaviour to monitor and secure the opening of a new 7,000-kilometre-long border region and strategic assets therein, and to support civilian activities in a harsh environment,” but after Russia’s action in Ukraine, increased Russian capability and activity in the Arctic has been read, again, as a sign of aggressive and threatening behaviour in a conflictual geopolitical situation.” The authors do not categorically deny all Arctic uniqueness, but they warn that it is more susceptible to external dynamics than is sometimes assumed.
The important implication of a non-exceptionalist Arctic is that preserving the Arctic’s current stability must become a much more deliberate political objective – that it certainly can no longer be left to geography and climate. For now, it is still true that, despite the soured relations between Russia and the West, the inclination to cooperate in the Arctic remains strong. While some military/security contacts with Russia in the Arctic have certainly been curtailed, the Ilulissat declaration of 2008 still essentially stands as a basic principle, and the Coast Guard Forum and the SAR and oil spill agreements continue to be the focus of implementation efforts.

However, no one seems to have told Canadian Senators, who released two new reports through the Canadian Senate Defence Committee just ahead of the Government’s defence policy statement. They contain little talk of a cooperative Arctic spirit and offer their own distinct takes on Arctic exceptionalism. One minor, but telling, example of the latter comes with the Senators’ routine distinction between the Arctic and the rest of Canada and North America. There is frequent use of phrases like “...Canadian sovereignty, including in the Arctic,” or the “defence of Canada, North America and the Arctic” (emphasis added) – as if Canadian sovereignty or the defence of Canada don’t include the Arctic unless it is specifically mentioned. It would be passing strange if the Senate reports had made the same distinct references to other regions (for example, had they referred to the defence of Canada, and the Maritimes, or “Canadian sovereignty, including the West”). One suspects that the Arctic is separately invoked mainly to appeal to the romance of the High North in an effort to bolster the Senate’s relentless campaigning for increased defence spending. It’s a fundraising effort that drives the Senate to make a special case for Arctic vulnerability, and more generally to reject the notion that the Arctic is, or can be, more shielded than other regions from the vagaries of a competitive international environment.

So the Senators appeal to a kind of reverse-exceptionalism, seeing the Arctic, not as isolated from tensions elsewhere, but as itself a source of tension. There are repeated references to “resurgent Russian military activity close to Canadian airspace in the North,” and an approving quote from one witness claiming those Russian aircraft to be “the real menace to Canadian sovereignty in the North” (R, p. 5). Other references are to “increased Russian activity around North America” (MU, p. 7), all supplemented by repeated references to Russian aggression and military activism generally.

This energetic wariness of Russia was certainly also part of the 2016 report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN). And while officials, in this case the Assistant Chief of Defence Intelligence, assured the committee “that Russia is at the top of our list in terms of countries we watch carefully and monitor closely” (p. 7, NDDN, Sept 2016), NORAD’s documentation of this airborne Russian “menace,” of Russian military aircraft in the region, paints a rather more subdued threat picture. According to NORAD’s 2016 testimony, “since 2007, NORAD jet fighters have conducted, on average, five intercepts per year of Russian military aircraft in the American or Canadian ADIZ (air defence identification zone). The peak year was 2014 when ten interceptions were made. The report says most of these interceptions occurred in the Arctic, “north of Inuvik,” but does not specify how many were carried out by Canadian aircraft. But the report emphasizes that “none of these Russian aircraft have ever penetrated into American or Canadian airspace, nor demonstrated any hostile intentions” (emphasis added). The Russian aircraft have a right to operate in international airspace, and the purpose of identification zones is to identify aircraft nearing North America while they are still in international air space, where they can be engaged regarding intentions and flight plans (p. 12, NDDN, Sept 2016). And, it is important to note...
that, except for the few Russian military aircraft on training and patrol flights in international air space, all aircraft in approaches to Canadian territory are civilian.

The same Committee heard extensive evidence of the growing cruise missile threat, and one witness concluded that “the Arctic would be a good location to establish cruise missile detection and interception sites, in light of the fact that Russian long-range military aircraft and submarines capable of launching cruise missiles regularly operate in that region” (p. 29, NDDN Sept 2016). It’s an issue that will necessarily be a prominent element of the coming debate over renewal of the North Warning System.

**The New Defence Statement and the Arctic**

The Russia-related alarms raised by officials, analysts, and Parliamentarians through the Senate and House of Commons reports were not carried over into the Government’s new defence policy statement. It has only three references to Russia, and only one of those is linked to the Arctic, though even it doesn’t suggest a threatening posture within or toward the Arctic itself. Instead, it notes a NATO concern that Russia is once again expanding its capacity to project force from the Arctic into the North Atlantic (p. 90). The statement does not treat Russia as benign. It points to the “illegal annexation of Crimea,” notes Russia’s “willingness to test the international security environment,” and acknowledges the return of “a degree of major power competition... to the international system” (p. 50). Notably, the Government defence policy statement makes no reference to the Russian bomber threat.

While the West understandably watches Russian military developments in the Arctic, it would also be useful to pay some attention to Russia’s own perceptions of threat related to the Arctic. Two Russian academics have offered a current and measured assessment of Russian threat perceptions in a 2017 paper published in the journal, *European Security*. It should not come as a surprise that Russia shares many of security concerns raised by other Arctic states. The Russians have also become more focused on soft or non-state security issues linked to climate change, growing competition over natural resources, and the protection and management of sea routes. The Russian military in the north is tasked with environmental cleanup, search and rescue, support for oil spill cleanup, monitoring poaching, and combatting smuggling and illegal migration. The authors describe military developments that include the build-up of naval bases along its northern sea route and the deployment of dual-use equipment and the performance of dual-purpose operations that involve search and rescue, monitoring civilian maritime and air traffic, navigation regulation, emergency response, and Arctic research.

At the same time, the authors acknowledge that geography has made the Arctic and the Kola peninsula in particular a key military bastion hosting nuclear submarine forces, a large conventional fleet, anti-submarine aircraft, air defence units, and so on. And fleet modernization, nuclear and conventional, adds to that prominence. But much of that military concentration is focused, not on the Arctic as much as on the rest of the world. Russia’s threat profile mirrors that of the West in that NATO has remained a perceived threat due to its expansion eastward, and that sense of threat grew following NATO’s build-up in response to Russian action on Ukraine. In addition, Russia is also said to worry about US intentions in the Arctic and its power projection possibilities.
The new Canadian defence policy does not envision any significant changes in the Arctic security environment – either in threat perceptions or in defence requirements. While the focus is on improving the Canadian Forces’ domain awareness and operational capacity in the Arctic, no new policy directions are identified, and the Arctic is not portrayed as a place where sovereignty is fragile and in constant need of being shored up. For the Arctic, it is not really a “new” Canadian defence policy. The basic themes of Canadian defence policy have been consistent over multiple decades and multiple Canadian governments, and the current Government continues to highlight the traditional roles of defending Canada and North America (the latter in cooperation with the US), and contributing to international peace and security.

The new policy statement, as well as the earlier Senate and House of Commons reports, include a number of Arctic-specific references.

**Threat perceptions**

The Government’s statement confirms the broad consensus that security threats relevant to the Arctic are not military, state-to-state, threats. While the Parliamentary reports include plenty of references to the challenges of an assertive Russia, the March 2016 testimony of the Assistant Chief of Defence Intelligence reflects the prevailing threat assumption when he says that the CAF “do not see a state actor that has both the capability and the intent to harm Canada militarily” (p. 6, NDDN, Sept 2014).

The House of Commons committee warns that intentions can change quickly, that defence is about planning for the unexpected, and that “preparing for the worst case scenario” should include “the low probability of a full-scale attack against Canada or North America by a foreign state” (p. 7, NDDN, Sept 2016), but its list of serious security challenges in the Arctic focuses on non-military threats: “environmental concerns over air and maritime pollution; the effects of climate change and the melting of the polar ice on the Arctic region; increases in commercial aviation and shipping traffic; industrial exploitation of natural resources; infringements of Canadian sovereignty; search and rescue incidents; and various other security threats and concerns” (p. 11, NDDN, Sept 2016).

The Government statement acknowledges, as already noted, that Russia’s large Kola Peninsula forces give it the ability to project force into the North Atlantic, but the statement does not equate that with a threat to Canadian territory or sovereignty. Defence Analyst Adam Lejeunesse “welcome[s] the recognition that, while Russia’s Arctic forces may threaten other NATO regions, they do not pose an immediate danger to the Canadian North.”

To the extent that security needs are changing in the Arctic, the changes are of course linked largely to the increasing accessibility of the region. As “an important international crossroads where issues of climate change, international trade, and global security meet,” growing commercial interests, research, and tourism are coming to Canada’s northern territory. And that rise in activity is not linked to growing defence concerns, but to “increased safety and security demands related to search and rescue and natural or man-made disasters to which Canada must be ready to respond” (p. 51).
Building domain awareness capacity

To meet those public safety demands, says the defence statement, Canada will have to pay increased attention to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity that is specifically tailored to the Arctic (p. 64) – in other words, to improved domain awareness. The Government promises new surveillance aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft (drones), the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships now under construction, and additional satellite capacity toward that end (p. 15 and p. 35). More effective land surveillance and links to Arctic communities are to come through the acquisition of “all-terrain vehicles, snowmobiles and larger tracked semi-amphibious utility vehicles optimized for use in the Arctic environment” (p. 37).

The Government statement announces an expansion of the Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) so that it covers the entire Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Notably, the North Warning System radars are not located at Canada’s northern frontier, leaving vast areas of Canadian territory in the archipelago beyond the reach of radar surveillance. The expanded ADIZ is intended to “increase awareness of the air traffic approaching and operating in Canada’s sovereign airspace in the Arctic” (p. 80). This move is not so much a response to Russian military aircraft training and patrolling in international airspace, but relates more specifically to civilian and commercial aircraft approaching Canadian airspace. As the statement explains, “an ADIZ typically begins at the edge of sovereign airspace and extends outward into international airspace,” so aircraft within those zones can be notified “that they may be intercepted if they do not notify Canadian authorities of their entry and exit through” it (p. 80).

Aiding civilian authorities

The preponderance of Arctic security threats “fall within the purview of civilian authorities responsible for law enforcement and public safety,” according to the House of Commons defence committee, and require “a whole-of-government response.” That makes the Canadian military a participant, but not the lead government department or agency, in responding to the primary security threats in the Arctic. The Canadian Armed forces are described as performing a long list of roles in the north: “supporting law enforcement organizations in their ongoing efforts to counter criminal networks and their illicit smuggling of narcotics, weapons and humans, responding to search and rescue incidents, providing aid to the civil authorities in the event of natural or man-made disasters and other national emergencies, engaging in fisheries and pollution patrols, fighting cyber threats, contributing to counter-terrorism efforts, as well as conducting regular sovereignty, reconnaissance and surveillance patrols in the Arctic” (p. 11, NDDN, Sept 2016).

Thus, the defence policy statement says the Canadian Forces will “maintain a robust capacity to respond to a range of domestic emergencies, including by providing military support to civilian organizations on national security and law enforcement matters when called upon, engaging in rapid disaster response, and contributing to effective search and rescue operations” (p.60). It too puts the focus on working with “whole-of-government partners” to support national security and public safety objectives and to engage with “Indigenous communities [that] are at the heart of Canada’s North” (p. 80).
Operational challenges in the Arctic

Search and rescue in the Arctic “poses a complex challenge” due to size, climate, and geography. The House of Commons Committee heard that only four percent of Canadian search and rescue incidents occur in the north, but every one of them is complex. “Because search and rescue air assets are located south, where most of Canada’s population lives and most search and rescue incidents occur, every search and rescue operation in the Arctic becomes ‘expeditionary in nature’ because of the long distances to cover. It takes up to eight hours for a CC-130 Hercules aircraft based in Winnipeg, and 12 to 16 hours for a CH-149 Cormorant helicopter, to reach the high north” (p. 39, NDDN Sept 2014).

The Government defence statement also emphasizes the operational complexity of norther public safety measures. The Canadian Arctic includes “75 percent of the country’s national coastlines and 40 percent of its total land mass. The sheer expanse of Canada’s North, coupled with its ice-filled seas, harsh climate, and more than 36,000 islands make for a challenging region to monitor – particularly as the North encompasses a significant portion of the air and maritime approaches to North America” (p. 79).

DND’s northern capacity

The Government statement refers to “the Defence team’s extensive Northern footprint [which] includes more than 800 buildings at over 60 sites,” and offers this summary:

“Joint Task Force North, headquartered in Yellowknife with detachments in Whitehorse and Iqaluit, anchors the Canadian Armed Forces’ Northern presence. The Canadian Armed Forces, including through NORAD, operates from a number of locations in the North, including in Inuvik, Yellowknife, Rankin Inlet, Iqaluit, and Goose Bay, which also help support the Northern deployment of fighter aircraft. The Canadian Armed Forces also shares a number of facilities with federal partners, including a state-of-the-art cold weather training facility at Resolute Bay, a signals intelligence facility at Canadian Armed Forces Station Alert - the northernmost permanently inhabited facility in the world - and a high Arctic weather station at Eureka. In addition, work is ongoing to complete the Nanisivik Naval Facility which will support operations of the new Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, and other government maritime vessels” (p. 79).

For a more detailed account, go to: Circumpolar Military Facilities of the Arctic Five.

The North Warning System (NWS), the chain of radar stations (without local staff) across the north is nearing the end of its useful life, and DND says it is cooperating with the US “to seek an innovative technological solution to continental defence challenges including early warning” (p. 80).

Building an Arctic Security Community

The imperative to cooperate in the Arctic is clear. “To succeed in an unpredictable and complex security environment,” DND plans to “increase [its] presence in the Arctic over the long-term and work cooperatively with Arctic partners” (p. 14).
However, in affirming Canada’s commitment “to exercising the full extent of its sovereignty,” the
defence statement makes a point of saying it will work in close collaboration with select Arctic
partners, including the United States, Norway and Denmark, to increase surveillance and monitoring
of the broader Arctic region” (emphasis added, p. 90). It goes on to promise “joint exercises with
Arctic allies and partners and support the strengthening of situational awareness and information
sharing in the Arctic, including with NATO” (p. 113). Intimations of ongoing limits to cooperation with
Russia, on the one hand, and the more direct introduction of NATO into Arctic domain awareness
operations, on the other, are in denial of the stark fact that international cooperation throughout
the whole of the arctic is not optional. The failure of the government’s new security policy to make
an overt commitment to the broad but foundational objective of building a stable and sustainable
pan-Arctic security community, is a major omission. The Government says “Canada must enhance
its ability to operate in the North and work closely with allies and partners” (p. 57), but the emphasis
obviously needs to be on all the Arctic partners. By now it should be clear that pursuing mutuality
and stability in a region that includes Russia should not focus security cooperation on NATO.

While Canadian politicians can muster impressive levels of indignation when Russia’s long-range
bombers venture near Canadian airspace on their routine training and patrol missions, defence
officials and earlier Prime Ministers have nevertheless insisted that “Canada does not anticipate any
military challenges in the Arctic,” and that “there is no likelihood of Arctic states going to war.” In
August 2012 the Department of National Defence spokesperson put it this way: “Defence issues do
not drive Arctic affairs.” That begs the question of why explicitly collaborative “surveillance and
monitoring of the broader Arctic region” cannot include all states in the region. The Russian
academics Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev suggest that Russia is ready for increased
Arctic cooperation among Arctic states in coordinating emergency assistance to civilian authorities,
sharing information and lessons learned from anti-terrorist operations, holding technical workshops
and skills development, exchanging observers, and promoting mutual assistance in SAR and
emergency response, and in sharing information on military policies and doctrines.

A security community that can claim a “dependable expectation of peaceful change” relies on
credible assurances from community members that they will not go to war with each other to settle
their disputes, and in their 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, the five Arctic Ocean states affirmed as much
when they said they would rely on the “extensive international legal framework [that] applies to the
Arctic Ocean” for “the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.” And a second
characteristic of a security community is the absence of an arms race – that is, the absence of a
competitive military build-up among the members of the community. That doesn’t necessarily mean
the absence of any individual or unilateral national military expansion, but it does mean that such
developments are not regarded as threatening to other members of the community and thus are not
destabilizing.

If “the attainment of a security community can...be tested operationally in terms of the absence of
significant organized preparations for war or large-scale violence among its members,” the Arctic
fails the test based on the strategic nuclear forces that are in and around the Arctic and certainly
prepared for “large-scale” violence. Furthermore, the Arctic is now militarizing enough to engender
wariness, but some perspective is in order. Much of Arctic military development is linked to civilian
requirements – building up a military infrastructure to help manage increased civilian activity.
Nevertheless, demilitarization (for example, Article 26 of UN Charter speaks of “maintain[ing]
international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”) remains the vision – one certainly worth nurturing in the Arctic.

Though climate and geography have to date combined to ensure the non-militarization of the surface of the Arctic Ocean, they obviously won’t continue that salutary service indefinitely – making this the time for the international community to politically enshrine what has until now come naturally. The University of Toronto’s Franklyn Griffiths elaborated such a proposal some time ago, and it has the great advantage of preserving what already exists, without having to break difficult new political ground.

A feature of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “zone of peace” speech was to block Western anti-submarine warfare operations in and near the home waters of the Soviet Northern and Baltic fleets. His term was, “limiting rivalry in anti-submarine weapons,” and undertaking confidence-building measures especially in the Greenland, Norwegian, and Baltic Seas. And a 2009 paper by Anatoli Diakov and Frank Von Hippel proposed again that Russia agree to confine its northern nuclear armed ballistic missile submarines to the Arctic and that the US agree to keep its attack submarines out of the Russian side of the Arctic.

There are various measures that Canada and others could encourage the states of the region to undertake and thus to reinforce “expectations of peaceful change” and to mitigate “organized preparations for war”:

- demonstrably configuring military deployments as defensive and, especially, linked to public safety;
- resuming and expanding regular meetings of chiefs of defence staff to heighten understanding of each other’s military operations and intentions;
- sharing military policies and doctrines among the Arctic states;
- sharing information on anti-terrorist operations within the Arctic region;
- exchanging observers and participants in northern exercises;
- exploring the shared use of public safety assets like airlift and helicopters;
- issuing regular and credible mutual declarations on the absence of military threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- actively exploring an appropriate forum for region-wide Arctic security consultations and coordination, and
- insistence by the Arctic’s five NATO members, as Canada has in the past, that NATO not become operationally present in the Arctic.

Measures that eschew competitive military expansion and that encourage expectations of peaceful change will serve to entrench the Arctic as a security community, and that in turn will help build a political/security climate of openness to proposals like an Arctic zone of peace or attack submarine exclusion zones.
Notes


6 Whitney Lackenbauer, “Canada and Russia – Toward an Arctic Agenda,” September 2, 2016


16 Prepared by Ernie Regehr, Senior Fellow in Defence Policy and Arctic Security, The Simons Foundation and Michelle Jackett, M.A. 
http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/arctic-security


18 In 2009, when CF-18s were scrambled to rendezvous with Russian bombers in international air space, the Prime Ministerial warned of the “increasingly aggressive” Russian flights and promised that Canada would fulfill its “obligations to defend our continental airspace.” He went on to insist that “we will defend our sovereignty and we will respond every time the Russians make any kind of intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic.” The Russian bombers did not enter Canadian airspace or “make any kind of intrusion on the sovereignty in Canada’s Arctic.” “Russia Denies Bomber Approached Canadian Airspace,” CBC News, 27 February 2009. 

19 The chief of Defence Staff and the Prime Minister respectively, both commenting in 2010. Quoted in: Michael Byers and Stewart Webb, “Canada’s F-35 purchase is a costly mistake,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, 17:3, 217-227.


Http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1318849


25 Just as the Seabed Treaty preserved the status quo in keeping nuclear weapons from the seabed, and just as NWFZs to date have largely preserved the status quo in keeping nuclear weapons out of regions from which they were already absent).This is only largely the case because the Pelindaba Treaty in fact helped to confirm the denuclearization that took place in Africa when South Africa divested itself of nuclear weapons, and in other regions, like Tlatelolco, when states with nuclear weapons programs agreed to halt them and the NWFZ solidified that posture into the future.


27 The Murmansk speech included these six proposals:

1. Establish a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe.
2. Restrict military activity and scale down naval and air force activities in the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian and Greenland Seas, and promote confidence-building measures in those areas.
3. Cooperation on resource development, including technology transfer.
4. Organization of an international conference on Arctic scientific research coordination, leading perhaps to an Arctic Research Council.
5. Cooperation in environmental protection and management.
6. Opening of the Northern Sea Route.